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Abstract
The Social Consequences of Close Votes: The Narrow Decriminalization of Sex Work in
New Zealand
Dana Hayward
2021

New Zealand became the first country in the world to fully decriminalize sex work
at the national level when it passed the Prostitution Reform Act (PRA) by a single vote in
2003. In this dissertation, I suggest that a close vote is a prism that illuminates the
relationship between law and social change, both theoretically and methodologically. In a
series of three articles, I explore the social and political consequences of New Zealand’s
narrowly-passed sex work law, concentrating specifically on media representations of sex
work, national repeal initiatives, and local bylaw-making processes.
In the first empirical chapter, I focus on how decriminalization influences media
representations of sex work. Because regulatory regimes governing sex work reflect and
shape normative beliefs about the acceptability of sex workers, full decriminalization is
essential to the eventual elimination of sex work stigma. Furthermore, under
decriminalization, media portrayals of sex work play an important role in shaping public
opinion. In this chapter, I leverage the closeness of the decriminalization vote to investigate
whether and how media representations are responsive to a change of law in the short term.
I compare portrayals of sex workers in New Zealand’s three largest newspapers in the six
months before and six months after the passage of the Prostitution Reform Act. I find that
decriminalization is associated with a decrease in labelling and certain forms of
stereotyping, but no change in separation. Furthermore, while the passage of the national

i

decriminalization law prohibited overt discrimination, it also indirectly enabled
discrimination at the local level through restrictive zoning.
In the second empirical chapter, I explore backlash to the Prostitution Reform Act,
which culminated in an unsuccessful attempt to repeal it through a citizens’ referendum in
2004. The closeness of the vote on the decriminalization law not only influenced opposition
efforts to repeal it, but also shaped perceptions of the legitimacy of other laws passed
around the same time, especially the Supreme Court Act (2003) and Civil Unions Act
(2004). Ultimately, the relatively narrow passage of these laws spurred two opposition
parties to include provisions for the expansion of direct democracy in their platforms for
the 2005 general election. I analyze the backlash to the Prostitution Reform Act and
Supreme Court Act in order to illustrate how closeness informed opposition messaging. I
argue that the narrow vote margin enabled backlash by creating a liminal space in which
opponents could challenge the legitimacy of the vote. Specifically, opposition discourse
focused on portraying the passage of the Prostitution Reform and Supreme Court Acts as
undemocratic.
In the third empirical chapter, I focus on local responses to the national sex work
law. Following the passage of the Prostitution Reform Act, municipalities varied widely in
their responses to decriminalization. Thirteen cities drafted new bylaws to control the
location of brothels; New Zealand’s capital, Wellington, chose to use an existing bylaw
rather than draft a new one. Bylaws in Auckland and Christchurch faced legal challenges
and were eventually struck down by the High Court of New Zealand on the grounds that
they were incompatible with the PRA. In this chapter, I explore this variation in municipal
ordinances. I focus primarily on the bylaw in Christchurch, which was not only one of the
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most restrictive, but also faced a protracted legal battle. I use an innovative shadow case
research design to suggest that the bylaw was largely a product of the interaction between
local conditions and national laws, including those unrelated to sex work. By comparing
Christchurch with Wellington, which did not draft or amend a bylaw after
decriminalization, I found that the outcome in Christchurch reflects the interaction of three
major factors: the relative prevalence of street-based sex work, the obligations placed on
the city council by the Local Government Act of 2002, and The Pressures created by
upcoming local elections and council restructuring.
In the conclusion, I highlight the ways in which this dissertation develops our
conceptual understanding of how and why closeness matters in legislative or electoral
contests. I suggest that responses to the Prostitution Reform Act illustrate the complex and
often unanticipated interactions between law and politics, at multiple levels and
occasionally across branches of government. I extend my analysis of close votes and
democracy frames to the case of the 2020 US Presidential election, a case which further
illustrates the ways in which closeness is constructed, and how, in the liminal space
following a vote perceived as close, political actors deploy democracy frames to challenge
the legitimacy of the outcome.
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Chapter 1
Close Votes as Legal Events
Introduction
On November 8, 2000, the Florida College of Electors reported that presidential
candidate George W. Bush had won the statewide popular vote, receiving 1,784 more votes
than opponent Al Gore. The close result triggered an automatic machine recount; by the
time it concluded on November 10, Bush’s margin of victory had shrunk to just 327 votes
(St. Petersburg Times 2000). On December 8, in a 4-3 decision, the Florida Supreme Court
ordered a manual statewide recount. The next day, in a 5-4 decision, the US Supreme Court
reversed that decision, ruling that no manual recount would be feasible in a reasonable time
period, and deciding the election for Bush (Firestone 2000). Without a doubt, Bush v. Gore
was a watershed moment for American democracy, and the implications of the case have
been dissected by academics, policymakers, and jurists. But this case is also striking in that
all of the crucial votes – the popular vote, the Florida Supreme Court ruling, and the US
Supreme Court reversal – were decided by the narrowest of margins.
Close votes happen more often than we realize. They occur throughout history,
around the world, and across branches of government. In 1800, Thomas Jefferson was
famously elected President by one vote in the US House of Representatives after a tie in
the Electoral College (Library of Congress 2018). In the United States, between 1902 and
2016, there were 159 state-level ballot measures that passed or failed by a margin of less
than one percent of the popular vote; when the margin is expanded to three percent, that
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number jumps to 1,045. These votes have been on issues as significant and diverse as
women’s suffrage, civil rights, and abortion access (NCSL 2016). Close direct democratic
votes have also decided questions of national sovereignty. In 1995, 50.58% of citizens in
Quebec rejected a referendum that would have seen them proclaim national sovereignty
and declare independence from Canada (Seguin 1995). In 2016, 51.89% of British citizens
voted to leave the European Union (Elliott and Coates 2016). Judicial decisions are often
close. For instance, between 1900 and 1990, over 1,400 US Supreme Court cases were
decided by a single vote (Riggs 1993). In addition to Bush v. Gore (2000), these narrow
rulings included Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (2010), which abolished
electoral spending limits for corporations, as well as United States v. Windsor (2013) and
Obergefell v. Hodges (2015), two landmark cases granting marriage rights to same-sex
couples. In the legislative domain, in 2003, the Government of New Zealand fully
decriminalized sex work at the national level when it passed the Prostitution Reform Act
by just one vote (Tunnah 2003b).
There is no universally agreed-upon margin at which a vote is deemed close. For
instance, in quantitative political science, scholars using a regression discontinuity design
most often define a vote as close if the margin of victory is within half of one percent. The
regression discontinuity design is a quasi-experimental approach to assessing the causal
effects of an intervention by comparing subjects just above and below an arbitrary cut-off
score. By comparing groups immediately to either side of this threshold, the RDD allows
researchers to assume ‘as-if random’ assignment to treatment. Though the RDD was
initially developed by Thistlethwaite and Campbell (1960) to assess the impact of merit
scholarships on future academic achievement, in recent years, political scientists have
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applied the approach to the study of close electoral races, using large datasets of close
elections in the Unites States and abroad to estimate things like incumbency effects, party
advantage, or political connections (see, for example: Lee 2001, 2008; Eggers et al. 2015).
The 0.5 percent margin is the most common threshold at which an automatic recount is
triggered; the possibility that the outcome is due to a tabulation error and could be
invalidated approximately the “as-if random assignment to treatment” of quasiexperimental research design (Caughey and Sekhon 2011). However, this decision is
entirely arbitrary – while 22 US states have laws on the books requiring an automatic
recount if a vote falls within a specific margin, that margin varies from 0 to 1 percent; in
four states, the recount isn’t tied to vote margin at all (Ballotpedia 2020a). In Canadian
federal elections, an automatic recount is triggered if a candidate wins by less than .1
percent of all votes, but candidates and voters can also petition a judge for a recount,
regardless of margin (Elections Canada 2019).
Quantitative approaches like the regression discontinuity design require an
inflexible cut-off, and investigators have defaulted to numeric indicators of closeness.
While it is not in principle impossible for such work to incorporate a sense of the cultural
constructedness of the perception of closeness, in practice these perceptions are highly
context-specific. Yet it is more important politically that a vote be perceived as close than
for it to conform to an arbitrary and context-independent definition of closeness.1 For
example, in parliamentary systems, whether or not Members are required to vote with their
parties will influence the margin at which a vote is deemed to be close. In a free vote,
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Thank you to Julia Adams for elevating the phrasing of this argument.
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individual decisions can make or break a piece of legislation, while a whipped vote could
turn on the decision of an entire party.
In this dissertation, I suggest that a close vote is a prism through which we can
analyze the relationship between law and social change, both theoretically and
methodologically. In a series of three articles, I use the narrow passage of the Prostitution
Reform Act in New Zealand as a case study to illustrate the social and political
consequences of law reform. In the first empirical chapter, I describe changes in media
representations immediately following the passage of the law. In the second chapter, I
illustrate how the closeness of the vote itself played a key role in shaping opposition
attempts to repeal the law. In the final empirical chapter, I explore variation in efforts to
regulate sex work at the local level following national decriminalization.

Close Votes as Legal Events
While the relationship between law and social change has long been central to law
and society research, the last twenty years have witnessed a ‘cultural turn’ in sociolegal
scholarship (Saguy and Stuart 2008). Researchers have increasingly drawn attention to the
ways in which laws shape and are shaped by the social and cultural environments in which
they develop (Friedman 1975, 1988; Hull 2003; Savelsberg and King 2005; Stoddard
1997). Culture is “defined in variable ways across research, including as beliefs, morals,
categories, cognitive frames, deeply seated assumptions about how the world operates, or
as a repertoire of responses to social situations” (Saguy and Stuart 2008:150). Nevertheless,
Saguy and Stuart (2008) identify three dominant approaches to the study of the relationship
between law and culture, reflecting distinct ways of operationalizing both culture and law.
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The first treats culture as an independent variable, taking law and legal practices as the
objects to be explained by cultural factors (for example, Savelsberg and King 2005). The
second “positions law as an independent variable with culture as a dependent outcome”
(Saguy and Stuart 2008:154). This type of work seeks to uncover the ways in which laws
and legal processes shape collective understandings of the world (for example, Hull 2003).
Both of these approaches reflect an instrumentalist assumption of law as a relatively
bounded sphere. Furthermore, in adopting the analytical lens of variables – if only for
theoretical or methodological reasons – both approaches promote a causal understanding
of the relationship between law and culture.
However, this paradigm of cause and effect raises important conceptual and
methodological difficulties. As Saguy and Stuart caution, “in trying to use the law to
explain culture or vice versa, there is a risk of tautological reasoning, in which, for instance,
one cites a specific national law as evidence of a corresponding cultural element while
simultaneously citing that same cultural element to explain the given law” (2008:156).
Cultural schemas are fundamentally entangled with legal institutions, making it difficult to
determine the degree to which laws shape or are shaped by their social and cultural
contexts. Increasingly, sociolegal scholars have proposed a third approach to the study of
law and culture that sidesteps these methodological issues by dispensing with causal
paradigms and instead treating law as culture (Ewick and Silbey 1998; Marshall and
Barclay 2003; McCann 1994; Merry 1990). Scholarship in this vein reflects the constitutive
perspective of law as fundamentally embedded within a social context. To date, the most
significant and influential strand of law as culture research promotes an analysis of what
Sarat and Kearns refer to as ‘the law in everyday life’. Rather than focusing on legal
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doctrine, this approach foregrounds “events and practices that seem on the face of things
removed from law, or at least not dominated by law from the outset” (Sarat and Kearns
2009:55). As Ewick and Silbey argue, “the law operates, perhaps most powerfully, in
rendering the world unproblematic. Indeed, in organizing and giving meaning to the most
routine every day events – such as buying groceries or driving down the street – the law
may be most present in its conspicuous absence” (1998:27). The law as culture paradigm
usefully dispenses with the conceptual rigidity and occasional tautological reasoning that
characterizes much instrumentalist and variable-centered work. However, in dismantling
the conceptual dichotomy of law/not law in favor of a holistic understanding of legality,
the law as culture approach can also sacrifice precision and rigor.
The theoretical basis of this dissertation is essentially constitutive: I consider the
law to be fundamentally and inextricably entangled with social practices, broadly defined.
However, to correct for the analytical and conceptual fuzziness that can accompany law as
culture and especially law in everyday life approaches, I draw on sociohistorical theories
of events and eventful analysis (Abbott 2001; Abrams 1982; Sewell 1996, 2009; WagnerPacifici 2010, 2017). Abrams defines an event as “a portentous outcome; [a] transformation
device between past and future. It has eventuated from the past and it signifies for the
future” (1982:191). Sewell clarifies that events are not singular, but, rather, comprised of
“sequences of occurrences that result in transformations of structures” (2009:227). Most
theoretical and empirical writing on events is drawn from cases that fundamentally altered
the course of history, like the storming of the Bastille (for example, Sewell 1996) or the
September 11 terrorist attacks (for example, Wagner-Pacifici 2010). However, I suggest
that eventful analysis can also be fruitfully applied to legal and legislative outcomes.
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Although the legality of issues like sex work cannot be clearly delineated in time or space,
a legislative vote on something like the Prostitution Reform Act is an event that heralds a
new social and political reality. What was once illegal is made legal. Even before official
ratification, implementation, or utilization of the new law, an approving vote calls into
question new legal rights and statuses. In cases where legislation is defeated, putting the
issue to the vote is still transformative; for example, the disappointment of a loss may spur
social movements to greater action.
Although the passage of the Prostitution Reform Act may not have the historical
significance of the taking of the Bastille, it is nevertheless well-suited to eventful analysis.
As Wagner-Pacifici notes, “events are always a surprise” (2017:2). As I discuss in the next
section, in New Zealand, the decriminalization of sex work ultimately turned on one
Member of Parliament’s personal change of heart. The eventful approach I adopt here is
complementary to the constitutive view of law as pervasive and deeply embedded in
everyday life. Wagner-Pacifici emphasizes “the ongoingness of events, the ways they are
restless and the ways they are subject to continuing oscillations between bounding and
unbounding as they extend in time and space” (Wagner-Pacifici 2017:5). The event of the
vote on the Prostitution Reform Act is a hinge element embedded within a longer sequence
of occurrences that constitute the legality of sex work in New Zealand. This approach
brings specificity to law as culture and constitutive scholarship, without the rigidity of
causal approaches.
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Sex Work Law Reform in New Zealand
New Zealand was the first country in the world to fully decriminalize sex work at
the national level when it passed the Prostitution Reform Act in 2003. Prior to the passage
of the PRA, the act of selling sex was not, it itself, illegal, though all related activities were
criminalized through the invocation of particular clauses in three existing laws. First, the
Crimes Act of 1961 made it illegal to keep or manage a brothel (Section 147), to live off
the earnings of another’s sexual labour (Section 148), or to procure or offer to procure
sexual services on behalf of another person (Section 149). Second, recognizing that many
brothel owners ran their businesses as massage parlours, the Massage Parlours Act of 1978
established a system of licensing for such establishments, prohibited the employment of
persons under the age of 18, and prohibited the employment of individuals with criminal
convictions for drug offenses or sex work. Third, the Summary Offences Act of 1981
criminalized solicitation in public places (Section 26). Many sex workers opposed these
laws, arguing that the regulatory regime was unfair and jeopardized the health and safety
of sex workers. In 1987, nine sex workers from Wellington established what would become
the New Zealand Prostitutes Collective, a civil society organization dedicated to
advocating for the rights of sex workers (Healy, Benachie, and Reed 2010).
In New Zealand, the eventual decriminalization of sex work was an unintended
consequence of the government’s attempts to combat HIV/AIDS. Recognizing that sex
workers were particularly vulnerable to HIV and other sexually transmitted infections, the
Department of Health approached the NZPC in the late eighties in order to set up HIV
prevention programs for sex workers. In 1988, the government of New Zealand began
offering funding to the group, which recruited sex workers to serve as peer sexual health
8

educators (Healy et al. 2010:44). The government relied on the NZPC to provide legitimacy
for its public health programs and to reach vulnerable populations. However, the Collective
claimed that their efforts to promote sexual health were being hampered by sex work laws.
For example, although an important component of the HIV peer health educator program
was the distribution of condoms and safer sex messaging to sex workers, police often used
the presence of such materials as evidence to arrest and charge sex workers and massage
parlour operators (Barnett et al. 2010). The NZPC threatened to refuse funding from the
Department of Health unless an interdepartmental committee was established to investigate
the effects of existing sex work legislation (Boniface 2003). Such a committee was
established, and in 1994, the NZPC began working with lawyers, activists, and scholars to
draft the Prostitution Reform Bill (PRB) (Healy et al. 2010). The bill, first introduced in
Parliament on September 21, 2000, by Labour MP Tim Barnett, was intended to protect
the rights and promote the health and safety of sex workers. It was designated a conscience
vote, meaning MPs would not be bound by party affiliation in making the decision to
support or reject the bill.
After a successful first reading in November of 2000, the bill was referred to the
Justice and Electoral Committee, where it was examined and debated during a select
committee stage that lasted nearly three years. The issue of municipal powers to regulate
sex work was a central point of contention during the committee stage. When the
Prostitution Reform Bill was first tabled, it did not include any clauses granting new rights
and powers to cities. Territorial authorities were expected to manage the location and
signage of commercial sex premises using existing legislation. Specifically, the Local
Government Act (1974) provided powers to local councils to regulate commercial signage,
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but did not explicitly contain provisions related to content. Additionally, the Resource
Management Act (1991) stipulated that councils could consider social, economic, and
cultural conditions in making planning decisions; the proponents of decriminalization felt
that these provisions would be sufficient in governing the location of brothels (Barnett
2007).
However, many city councils and local residents feared that relying on existing
legislation like the Local Government Act and Resource Management Act would allow
brothels to spring up “where there are now corner dairies” (Christchurch City Council
2003:2). As Councillor Sue Wells put it in a letter to Parliament,
The Christchurch City Council has very real concerns about its ability to adequately control
the effects of brothel-keeping and prostitution should the Bill become law. […] The
Council is particularly concerned that there is a belief that the Resource Management Act
1991 would control effects which arise from this activity. Our legal advice is that the
Resource Management Act is quite clearly not able to deal with the social effects, and we
are clear that the community we represent would expect us to be able to. The Council is
deeply concerned that a brothel would be able to establish anywhere any other kind of retail
activity can establish. We think it is unreasonable that there are no controls in this Bill
which would limit the establishment of brothels near schools, churches, kindergartens, and
other places of public gathering. […] Unless you provide the powers to control the industry,
you will open a Pandora’s Box which you will not be able to close again. (Christchurch
City Council 2003:1–2)

These views were shared by other city councils, who expressed their concerns to the Justice
and Electoral Committee.
In November 2002, in a concession to municipalities, the Committee recommended
an amendment allowing cities to regulate offensive signage, but cautioned that, given “the
fact that businesses other than those offering commercial sexual services might include
offensive content on their signs, […] it was possibly out of step with the purpose of the
[Prostitution Reform Bill] to target prostitution in this way” (Government of New Zealand
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2002d:13). However, the Committee initially rejected council’s requests to be given the
right to regulate the location of brothels:
A Majority of us consider the RMA, along with the District Plan of a local or territorial
authority, is sufficient to control undesirable prostitution activity and planning matters
relating to the sex industry. […] The bill will repeal the offense of soliciting and, under a
decriminalized model, it would be inconsistent and risk creating to create new offenses
relating to where this can take place. […] By majority, we recommend there be no
provisions in the bill that limit the conduct and location of prostitution. (Government of
New Zealand 2002d:14–15)

The Committee did acknowledge that local powers to regulate the location of the sex
industry would likely remain an issue; it included a discussion of potential regulatory
schemes in its report to Parliament “so that a member [of the House] who wishes to propose
an amendment enabling local authorities to have this power has the benefit of our
consideration” (15). The Committee proved prescient on this issue. Shortly before the
Bill’s third and final reading, Phil Goff, then-Justice Minister, proposed an amendment
delegating authority to city councils to regulate the location of brothels on the basis of
neighbourhood character and the likelihood of causing offense.
Decriminalization was controversial, and the Government anticipated a close result.
But MPs who had previously indicated their support of decriminalization were suddenly
suggesting they would vote against the bill in the third and final reading (Venter 2003).
Goff’s amendment, which was approved, was intended to shore up flagging support in the
run up to the final vote. Additionally, in a final attempt to ensure passage of the Bill, on
June 24, 2003, just one day before the final vote, a clause was added to the effect that
Parliament “does not endorse or morally sanction prostitution or its use”. These strategies
paid off, and the Prostitution Reform Act was passed on June 25, 2003, in a vote of 60 for,
59 against, and one abstention. The outcome hinged on the decision of Ashraf Choudhury,
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the country’s first Muslim MP, who, despite voting ‘No’ on all previous readings of the
bill, abstained, citing moral and religious readings (a tied vote would have resulted in the
bill’s defeat). The Prostitution Reform Act remains in force to this day.

Outline of the Dissertation
In this dissertation, I use the decriminalization of sex work in New Zealand as a
case study through which to illustrate the complex social and political consequences of law
reform. In Chapter 2, I explore the influence of decriminalization on media representations
of sex work in the short term. I use the narrow passage of the Prostitution Reform Act to
problematize assumptions about the pace of cultural change after law reform. I compare
stigma in newspaper portrayals of sex work in the six months before and six months after
the passage of the PRA. While most sex work scholars assume that it will take years to
notice changes in cultural norms surrounding sex work after decriminalization, I find
noticeable differences in the portrayals of sex workers in major newspapers just months
after a major legal change. Specifically, there was a slight decrease in labelling and certain
forms of stereotyping after the passage of the Act. However, my media analysis also
suggests a sharp increase in discriminatory municipal bylaws after decriminalization. I
explore these bylaws in greater detail in Chapter 3.
In Chapter 3, I focus on backlash to the Prostitution Reform Act, which culminated
in an unsuccessful attempt to repeal it in 2004, as well as broader political efforts to prevent
the passage of significant or controversial legislation by simple majority. I incorporate a
second case, New Zealand’s Supreme Court Act (2003), which passed in a close vote a few
months after the sex work law, to suggest that the closeness of a vote can play a role in
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backlash against legislation by creating conditions in which opponents can challenge the
legitimacy of the vote. In New Zealand, opposition discourse focused on portraying the
votes on both the Prostitution Reform Act and Supreme Court Act as fundamentally
undemocratic. The backlash to these cases illustrates how the contingency of a close vote
creates new opportunities for political action.
In Chapter 4, I return to the municipal responses to the national sex work law
introduced in the second chapter. Although municipal powers played a significant role in
the passage of the national law, city council responses to the Prostitution Reform Act varied
widely. While some localities relied on existing legislation and ordinances to regulate
brothels, others, especially Christchurch and Auckland, passed highly restrictive bylaws
that were found to contravene the national law and invalidated by the High Court of New
Zealand. How can we account for the variation in local responses to the national law? I
compare Christchurch with Wellington, the only major city not to draft or amend a bylaw
after decriminalization, to argue that harsh bylaws reflect the complex and often
unanticipated interaction of local conditions and national laws, including those unrelated
to sex work itself.
In Chapter 5, the conclusion, I summarize the findings of each chapter, extend a
central argument of the dissertation by briefly discussing the relevance of close votes and
democracy frames to the 2020 US Presidential election, and outline the methodological
and theoretical contributions of the work.
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Chapter 2
Does Decriminalization Mean Destigmatization? The Influence of
Law Reform on Media Portrayals of Sex Work
Introduction
In 2015, over 30 million individuals were estimated to work in the sex industry
worldwide (Fondation Scelles 2016). Despite its prevalence, sex work is highly
stigmatized, and, as Ronald Weitzer notes, this stigma “is manifested in public opinion
polls, media representations, political discourse, face-to-face encounters, and the ways in
which individuals internalize stereotypes, conceal their stigmatized identity, and lead
double lives” (Weitzer 2018:717). While prostitution remains illegal in over one hundred
countries, in recent years, a number of states have legalized or decriminalized sex work to
varying degrees, and the effects of sex work legislation have become the focus of
significant attention in both academic and policy circles. Although contrasting regulatory
approaches may not effectively deter the purchase or sale of sex, sex work legislation plays
an important role “in constructing the space, subjects, and systems of governance” (Scoular
2010:23). Full decriminalization, which entails the removal of all criminal laws pertaining
to the buying or selling of sexual services, is essential for the eventual elimination of sex
work stigma at the societal level (Weitzer 2018).
Media representations of sex work play an important role in shaping public
discourse about the sex industry, especially where sex work is decriminalized. As
Easterbrook-Smith argues, by removing the regulation of the sex industry from the judicial
sphere, decriminalization empowers the media to define the limits of acceptable sex work
14

(2018:187). I ask: How does decriminalization influence media representations of sex
work? I focus specifically on a comparison of stigma in portrayals of sex work before and
after the passage of New Zealand’s Prostitution Reform Act (PRA) in 2003. Following
Link and Phelan (2001), I define stigma as a co-occurrence of four components – labelling,
stereotyping, separation, and status loss and discrimination – and use these four
components to frame my qualitative content analysis. On the basis of a comparative
analysis of newspaper portrayals of sex work and sex workers in the six months preceding
and six months following the passage of the law, I find that decriminalization in New
Zealand was associated with a slight decrease in labelling and stereotyping. I also present
preliminary findings that suggest a sharp increase in certain forms of discrimination
following the passage of the Prostitution Reform Act.
In the first section, I review scholarship on sex work stigma and the power of law.
In the second section, I provide an overview of my case selection, method, and data, and
in the third section, I discuss my empirical results. I analyze the provisions of the PRA,
suggesting that, although the law did not explicitly seek to reduce stigma, it sent important
cultural messages about the dignity of sex workers and the legitimacy of sex work. I then
present the results of my media analysis, focusing specifically on Link and Phelan’s four
components of stigma.

Sex Work Stigma and the Power of Law
In 1963, Goffman defined stigma as “an attribute that is deeply discrediting”, which
reduces the bearer of the mark “from a whole and usual person to a tainted, discounted
one” (1963:3). In recent years, scholars have built on Goffman’s work to articulate
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sophisticated theoretical models of stigma, emphasizing the social, cultural, and relational
dimensions of the stigma complex (Pescosolido and Martin 2015). One influential
approach is that proposed by Link and Phelan, in which stigma is defined in terms of
relationships between four interrelated concepts: 1) labelling, in which people identify and
label differences in others; 2) stereotyping, in which those labels are linked to negative
characteristics; 3) separation, in which labelled and stereotyped individuals or groups are
placed in distinct categories that emphasize the difference between ‘us’ and ‘them’; 4)
status loss and discrimination, in which labelled persons are rejected and socially excluded
(2001:367). Pescosolido et al. take a systems approach to emphasize that these components
of stigma shape and are shaped by factors at all levels of social life (2008:433). In recent
years, sex work scholarship has increasingly engaged with systems approaches. For
instance, Benoit et al. (2018) apply the theoretical model developed by Pescosolido et al.
(2008) to the case of sex work stigma, identifying four broad sources of stigma operating
at different levels of society: laws, regulations and social policies; the media; health care
and justice systems; and the public at large and sex workers themselves (Benoit et al.
2018:461). In another example, Ryan, Nambiar, and Ferguson articulate a three-tiered
model of sex work stigma as operating experientially (through actions and reactions),
symbolically (in communication), and structurally (through systems and institutions)
(2019:85).
There is a rich empirical literature exploring the consequences of sex work stigma
on the quality of life, health, and safety of sex workers (Armstrong 2018; Benoit et al.
2018; Bruckert and Hannem 2013; Ryan et al. 2019; Weitzer 2012). Scholars have also
drawn attention to the important role of representations in promoting or combating sex
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work stigma (Easterbrook-Smith 2018; Farvid and Glass 2014; Saewyc et al. 2013;
Showden 2017). As Hallgrimsdottir and colleagues argue: “Media representations [are]
important conduits of stigma against those working in the sex industry. This is because it
is through the media that most of us, including academics and policy makers, acquire much
of our knowledge of sex work” (2006:120). They further suggest that media portrayals can
have real consequences on the lived experiences of sex workers: “The (mis)representations
of sex workers found in mainstream media outlets thus have the potential to shape both the
day-to-day interactions sex workers have with their clients as well as the legal and policy
environments that shape their lives” (Hallgrimsdottir et al. 2006:120). Research has
documented stigmatizing representations of sex work and sex workers in film (Blasdell
2015), television (Dunn 2012), and print media (Easterbrook-Smith 2018; Farvid and Glass
2014; Fitzgerald and Abel 2010; Hallgrimsdottir et al. 2006).
Increasingly, researchers have turned their attention to the ways in which sex work
stigma can be managed, reduced, and eventually eliminated. Although early research on
resistance to stigma emphasized the strategies used by individuals to manage psychological
distress and social exclusion, scholars have begun to explore the larger question of how
stigma can be combated at the societal level (Weitzer 2018:718). In a recent review article,
Weitzer (Weitzer 2018) identifies a number of preconditions for the elimination of sex
work stigma, including the use of neutral language, changes in media portrayals, industry
reform, activism on the part of sex workers and academics, and decriminalization. In a
response to Weitzer, Sanders (2018) emphasizes that decriminalization is crucial to
destigmatization because the law plays a significant role in determining the boundaries of
citizenship/non-citizenship. This echoes the argument made by Jane Scoular, who suggests
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that the power of sex work law is less in its specific regulatory provisions and more in its
potential to discursively produce subjects and determine their capacity for action in ways
that align with broader social structures (2010:29).
There is a growing literature addressing the impact of decriminalization on stigma,
especially in New Zealand (Abel and Fitzgerald 2010; Armstrong 2018). In addition,
recognizing the symbolic power of the decriminalization model, some authors have looked
specifically at the impact of decriminalization on media representations of sex work and
sex workers (Easterbrook-Smith 2018; Farvid and Glass 2014; Fitzgerald and Abel 2010).
As Easterbrook-Smith argues, media representations become even more powerful after
decriminalization because, “in the absence of the ability to control socially problematized
or ‘unacceptable’ forms of sex work through a legislative framework, the power to
determine what is acceptable or tolerable [moves] from law enforcement to the media”
(Easterbrook-Smith 2018:198). In a 2010 content analysis of newspaper reporting on sex
work from 2003 to 2006, Fitzgerald and Abel (2010) report a high prevalence of moralizing
media discourses; interviews with 58 sex workers suggest that workers perceived the media
to be highly stigmatizing, even after decriminalization. Farvid and Glass (2014) conducted
a critical discourse analysis of newspaper articles published between 2000 and 2013, and
found that media representations after the passage of the Prostitution Reform Act continued
to rely on stereotypical and gendered tropes, particularly where street-based workers were
concerned. Finally, Easterbrook-Smith (2018) found significant racism and transmisogyny
in media representations of sex work between 2010 and 2016.
It is useful to situate the work on sex work decriminalization and stigma within
broader theoretical literatures on the relationship between law and social change. While
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this relationship has long been central to law and society research, the last twenty years
have witnessed a ‘cultural turn’ in sociolegal scholarship (Saguy and Stuart 2008).
Researchers have increasingly drawn attention to the ways in which laws shape and are
shaped by the cultural environments in which they develop (Friedman 1975, 1988; Hull
2003; Savelsberg and King 2005; Stoddard 1997). Much of this work reflects an
instrumentalist assumption of law as a relatively bounded sphere – the law is either an
object to be explained by cultural factors, or an “independent variable with culture as a
dependent outcome” (Saguy and Stuart 2008:154). In adopting the analytical lens of
variables, instrumentalist approaches promote a causal understanding of the relationship
between law and culture.
However, this paradigm of cause and effect raises important conceptual and
methodological difficulties. Cultural schemas are fundamentally entangled with legal
institutions, making it difficult to determine the degree to which laws shape or are shaped
by their cultural contexts. Increasingly, sociolegal scholars have proposed a third approach
to the study of law and culture that sidesteps these methodological issues by dispensing
with causal paradigms and instead treating law as culture (Ewick and Silbey 1998; Marshall
and Barclay 2003; McCann 1994; Merry 1990). Scholarship in this vein reflects a
constitutive perspective of law as fundamentally embedded within a social and cultural
context.
The arguments advanced by Weitzer, Sanders, Scoular, and others about the
destigmatizing potential of decriminalization are in keeping with this constitutive
approach. These authors highlight the ways in which sex work laws shape and are shaped
by a broader social and cultural landscape that includes social movement activism, industry
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reform, media, and language. The law-as-culture paradigm is useful in that it dispenses
with the conceptual rigidity that characterizes much instrumentalist and variable-centered
work. However, in dismantling the conceptual dichotomy of law/not law in favour of a
more holistic understanding of legality, the law as culture approach can also sacrifice
specificity and rigor. This is largely true of existing work on the implications of
decriminalization on media representations of sex work. For instance, Fitzgerald and Abel
(2010) conduct a detailed content analysis of newspaper portrayals of sex work in the three
years after decriminalization, but do not include a control measure of coverage from before
the law was changed. Farvid and Glass (2014) do include media portrayals preceding
decriminalization in their study of representations between 2000 and 2013, but
significantly oversample coverage from after the law was changed. Easterbrook-Smith
(2018) focuses exclusively on portrayals from between 2010 and 2016; the seven-year gap
between the passage of the law and the beginning of the period of study raises questions
about the impact of decriminalization on the author’s findings.
Like Weitzer, Sanders, and Scoular, my theoretical orientation is essentially
constitutive: I consider sex work legislation to be fundamentally and inextricably entangled
with social and cultural practices. However, to address the analytical and conceptual
fuzziness that can accompany the law-as-culture approach, I draw on sociohistorical
theories of events and eventful analysis (Abbott 2001; Abrams 1982; Sewell 1996, 2009;
Wagner-Pacifici 2010, 2017). Abrams defines an event as “a portentous outcome; [a]
transformation device between past and future. It has eventuated from the past and it
signifies for the future” (1982:191). Sewell clarifies that events are not singular, but, rather,
comprised of “sequences of occurrences that result in transformations of structures”
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(2009:227). Most theoretical and empirical writing on events is drawn from cases that
fundamentally altered the course of history, like the Storming of the Bastille (Sewell 1996)
or the September 11 terrorist attacks (Wagner-Pacifici 2010).
I suggest that eventful analysis can also be fruitfully applied to legal and legislative
outcomes. Although the legality of sex work in New Zealand cannot be clearly delineated
in time or space, I argue that the passage of the Prostitution Reform Act is an event that
heralds a new social and political reality. What was once illegal is made legal; individuals
in the sex industry are granted new rights and status and brought under the formal
protection of the state. The decriminalization of sex work in New Zealand is well-suited to
eventful analysis because it was so close – the PRA passed by only one vote. As WagnerPacifici notes, no one actor controls the course of events; “events are always a surprise”
(2017:2). Close votes are inherently contingent; furthermore, as I discuss in the next
section, the outcome of the vote ran contrary to earlier predictions. The eventful approach
I adopt here is complementary to the constitutive view of law as pervasive and deeply
embedded in everyday life. Wagner-Pacifici emphasizes “the ongoingness of events, the
ways they are restless and the ways they are subject to continuing oscillations between
bounding and unbounding as they extend in time and space” (2017:5). I argue that the event
of the passage of the Prostitution Reform Act is a hinge element embedded within a longer
sequence of occurrences that constitute the legality of sex work in New Zealand.
My paper seeks to contribute to and extend existing literatures on sex work stigma
and decriminalization, both conceptually and methodologically. First, while I agree with
Weitzer (2018) and others that decriminalization is essential to combating stigma, I see law
reform as a source of destigmatization, rather than a precondition. As Bruckert and Hannem
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point out, the minimal regulations surrounding sex work under decriminalization models
“serve to significantly reduce structural stigma by relying less on assumptions of inherent
risk” (2013:61). In keeping with the systems approach proposed by Ryan, Nambiar, and
Ferguson (2019), by analyzing media representations of sex work immediately before and
after a narrowly passed law, I explore whether destigmatization at the structural level is
associated with a change in stigma at the symbolic level. Second, while the media analyses
cited above provide nuanced accounts of sex work representations after decriminalization,
I use a more abductive approach, applying Link and Phelan’s components of stigma as a
primary coding scheme. By analyzing representations in terms of these disaggregated
components, I allow for the possibility of variation not only in the degree of stigma
observed in representations of sex work after decriminalization, but also in kind. Finally,
existing work takes a long-term view of decriminalization and overlooks the significance
of the event of the passage of the Act. My approach empirically explores the short-term
transformative potential of legal events, rather than simply assuming the existence of
cultural lag. I use comparative approach in which the period of study is kept deliberately
short, and the duration of the pre- and post-implementation are the same. I explain these
methodological choices in greater detail in the next section.

Case Selection, Data, and Method
Prostitution Law Reform in New Zealand
New Zealand was the first country to decriminalize sex work at the national level
when it narrowly passed the Prostitution Reform Act in 2003. Prior to the passing of the
PRA, the act of selling sex was not illegal, though all related activities were criminalized.
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Decriminalization was the result of more than a decade of activism. In 1987, nine sex
workers from Wellington established what would become the New Zealand Prostitutes
Collective, a civil society organization dedicated to advocating for the rights of sex workers
(Healy et al. 2010). Beginning in the late 1980s, the group worked closely with the New
Zealand Department of Health to establish HIV prevention programs for sex workers. The
government relied on the organization to provide legitimacy for its public health programs
and to reach vulnerable populations, which gave the NZPC leverage to lobby for legal
reform. In 1994, an interdepartmental government committee was established to
investigate the effects of existing sex work legislation. Working closely with the NZPC,
lawyers, and scholars, the committee began drafting what would eventually become the
Prostitution Reform Act (Healy et al. 2010). The bill was introduced in Parliament by
Labour MP Tim Barnett on September 21, 2000.
Although politicians on both the right and the left of the political spectrum
supported the Act, it was highly controversial, and passed second reading by a narrow
margin. In the weeks leading up to the final vote, MPs who had previously indicated their
support for decriminalization began to waver. Several late amendments were added to the
bill in an attempt to shore up support before the final vote (Tunnah 2003c). Most notably,
municipalities were granted powers to restrict the location and signage of brothels, and a
clause was added to the legislation to the effect that Parliament “does not endorse or
morally sanction prostitution or its use”. Just hours before the final vote, the Dominion
Post reported that the campaign was “teetering on the brink of failure as heavy lobbying
takes its toll on supporters of the [bill]” (Venter 2003). Nevertheless, the amendment
strategy proved successful, and the Prostitution Reform Act passed on June 25, 2003, in a
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vote of 60 for, 59 against, and one abstention. The country’s first Muslim MP, Ashraf
Choudhury, unexpectedly abstained, citing moral and religious reasons. Choudhury had
voted against the bill on all previous readings; his unexpected decision to abstain rather
than cast a negative vote was integral to the approval of the PRA, as a tied vote would have
resulted in the bill’s defeat.
The uncertainty that surrounded decriminalization and the extremely close vote
make the passage of the Prostitution Reform Act a critical juncture embedded within a
much longer incremental process of sex work law reform. Not only does New Zealand have
one of the most liberal approaches to sex work in the world, but legislative reform also
occurred all at once rather than in a piecemeal fashion. In other words, the Prostitution
Reform Act fundamentally and immediately transformed the social meaning of sex work,
transforming it from deviant and criminal to legal and protected. In a sense, the passage of
the PRA resembles a natural experiment – the social and legal landscape surrounding sex
work in New Zealand changed suddenly and dramatically, hinging on Choudhury’s
unpredictable personal change of heart.
Data and Method
In order to analyze the influence of decriminalization on representations of sex
work, I compared portrayals of sex work and sex workers in New Zealand’s three largest
newspapers in the six months preceding and the six months following the passage of the
Prostitution Reform Act. I chose the three daily newspapers with the highest circulation
numbers: The New Zealand Herald, based in Auckland, the Dominion Post, based in the
capital city of Wellington, and The Press, based in Christchurch. By focusing on these
papers, which serve New Zealand’s largest cities on both the North and South Islands, I
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was also able to capture some regional variation. Given the emergence of social and new
media, a sole focus on print journalism would be indefensible today. However, because I
am interested in representations of sex workers over a short period of time before the advent
of social media, newspaper articles are an appropriate data source.
Given my theoretical interest in the event of the passage of the Act, I deliberately
limit the period of study to one year in order to identify potential changes in representations
at a crucial moment in time. Other scholars have assumed that changes in stigma are
necessarily a long-term process. For instance, Weitzer writes, “we should expect cultural
lag in the aftermath of legal reform: it can take considerable time for social norms to mesh
with legal norms” (2018:722). To be sure, significant destigmatization at the societal level
is a long-term, ongoing project; studies using alternate methodologies and measures of
stigma have found that high levels of sex work stigma persist in New Zealand more than a
decade after the passage of the Act (Armstrong 2018). In this study, however, I
problematize the assumption of cultural lag by looking at a brief snapshot of
representations on either side of the close vote.
This design is inspired by recent experimental and quasi-experimental work on the
effect of legal rulings on public opinion and attitudes toward moral issues. For example,
Tankard and Paluck conducted a longitudinal survey of public attitudes and norm
perceptions of same-sex marriage in the four months surrounding the United States
Supreme Court ruling in Obergefell v. Hodges. They found robust evidence that the verdict
was associated with a significant change in respondents’ perceived social norms in support
of gay marriage. One day after the event, the same participants reported higher current and
future perceived support for same-sex marriage than they had five days prior (2017:1341).
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Social psychological studies have consistently shown that norm perception – in other
words, someone’s perception of what other people believe – is an important predictor of
behaviour. Individuals behave in accordance with perceived norms to avoid social
rejection, even when these norms do not align with their personal attitudes or beliefs
(Cialdini and Goldstein 2004; Tankard and Paluck 2016, 2017). Tankard and Paluck point
out that mass media plays a crucial role in changing “perceptions of what the group
currently believes or will believe” (2017:1335). Given the role of both the media and the
law in shaping perceived norms, it is important to explore how media portrayals of issues
like sex work respond to legal events in the short term.
Using Nexis Uni, I conducted a search for all articles published in the three
newspapers between December 25, 2002 and December 25, 2003 containing the words
‘sex work’, ‘sex worker(s)’, ‘prostitute(s)’, ‘prostitution’, ‘Prostitution Reform Bill, and
‘Prostitution Reform Act’. My initial search yielded 574 articles, with 262 published before
decriminalization and 312 published after. I eliminated duplicate articles, articles published
in the Arts or Entertainment sections, and everything under 300 words, which left me with
a total sample of 355 articles. There were 163 articles published before the legal change,
and 192 published after. Approximately 40 percent of articles in both the initial sample and
subsample were opinion pieces.
Using the software program N-Vivo 11, I analyzed the data following the flexible
coding approach proposed by Deterding and Waters (2018). Although this approach was
developed primarily for use with interview transcripts, it is also well-suited to qualitative
content analysis. Unlike traditional qualitative coding techniques derived from grounded
theory, flexible coding proposes a two-stage process in which researchers first become
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familiar with their data by applying broad codes reflecting the concepts motivating the
study. These broad codes serve as a type of index, allowing the researcher to more easily
apply focused codes to subsections of the data. I used Link and Phelan’s components of
stigma as the broad coding scheme, as this model is well-established in the stigma
literature. After indexing the data according to these components, I used a more inductive
approach to identify specific themes. For example, in the initial stage of data analysis, I
tagged passages that exemplified stereotyping, the second component of stigma. In the
second stage, I conducted a close reading of those passages to determine which stereotypes
were most prevalent, and how they were being deployed discursively.

Findings
In this section, I analyze the Prostitution Reform Act to suggest that, while the law
did not explicitly intend to reduce stigma, it communicated important messages about the
legitimacy of sex work. I then present the results of my comparative media analysis, which
suggest that while decriminalization was associated with a slight reduction in some forms
of stigma, it inadvertently enabled a new form of discrimination at the local level.
The Prostitution Reform Act and Stigma
In Section 3 of the PRA, the Government of New Zealand stipulates four objectives
of the Act: 1) to defend the human rights of sex workers and to protect them from abuse;
2) to promote the welfare, and occupational health and safety of sex workers; 3) to promote
public health; 4) to prohibit the use of minors in prostitution or other sex work (Government
of New Zealand 2003a:4). The legislation does not officially pertain to changing norms or
attitudes about sex work; nevertheless, many stakeholders opposed to decriminalization
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interpreted the bill as sending a dangerous message about the legitimacy of prostitution
(Anon 2003c). Whether or not the PRA was designed to change social attitudes, the Act
sends an important and complex message about the dignity of sex workers and the
legitimacy of sex work as an occupation. It does this in two ways: first, by highlighting the
agency and humanity of sex workers by explicitly acknowledging their human rights, and
second, by portraying those involved in the sex industry as workers subject to the same
protections and obligations as other employees.
However, the Act’s messaging is ambiguous in a crucial respect. Section 3 of the
PRA states, “The purpose of this Act is to decriminalize prostitution (while not endorsing
or morally sanctioning prostitution or its use)”, before enumerating the specific objectives
of the legislation (Government of New Zealand 2003a:4, emphasis added). The addition of
this clause undermines the Government’s messaging about the legitimacy of sex work and
the dignity of sex workers by inserting a value judgment about the morality of prostitution.
Nevertheless, the inclusion of this normative language does not outweigh the PRA’s
broader destigmatizing message. The clause was added to the legislation just weeks before
the final vote. As Sunstein notes, for the law to be legible to the broader public, it must be
filtered through media sources or articulated through clarifying statements from politicians
(1996:2050–51). For nearly three years, newspapers published articles about the bill as it
worked its way through the legislative process. After the late amendment, the new language
was reported by The Press, New Zealand’s third-largest newspaper, in the context of a
single article about the negotiating strategies used by those in favor of decriminalization
(Espiner 2003). The amendment was not covered by either of the two largest papers. Thus,
although the new language certainly complicated the destigmatizing implications of the
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Prostitution Reform Act, I suggest that broader messaging about the legitimacy of sex work
and the dignity of sex workers was significantly more dominant.
Media Portrayals of Sex Work Before and After Decriminalization
In defining stigma, Link and Phelan (2001) identify four interrelated components:
labeling, stereotyping, separation, and status loss and discrimination. Newspapers are an
important primary source of forms of stigma that rely on discursive framing – labeling,
stereotyping, and separation – so media analysis is an effective methodology through which
to account for them. However, newspaper articles are not a sufficient data source to make
conclusive claims about discrimination. In the pages to follow, I present the results of my
comparative media analysis, focusing primarily on labeling, stereotyping, and separation,
and briefly sketch a new discriminatory trend that emerged from the newspaper data. In the
sections that follow, I suggest that although the passage of the Prostitution Reform Act was
associated with a decrease in labelling and stereotyping, the law inadvertently created
opportunities for municipalities to discriminate against sex workers by passing restrictive
zoning regulations.
Labelling and Stereotyping
Labeling is the first component of stigma, occurring when people distinguish and
label oversimplified differences. Stereotyping occurs when these labels are associated with
negative attributes or characteristics. Labels and stereotypes work in tandem as signifier
and signified; the sign ‘sex worker’ or ‘prostitute’ is made meaningful through the
relationship between the label and its associated stereotype.
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The simplest way to account for labeling is to track the frequency of pejorative
terms used in the media. There were many instances in which columnists used derogatory
terms such as ‘whore’ to refer to sex work, sex workers, and brothels. These terms call to
mind immorality, promiscuity, and debasement. In my sample, the terms ‘whore’ and
‘hooker’ were the most commonly used, but sex workers were also referred to as harlots,
sinners, fallen women, vile wretches, streetwalkers, and, once, human spittoons. There was
a slight decrease in the frequency of negative labels following decriminalization, though
the magnitude of the effect depends on the unit of analysis. Slurs were used 21 times before
the passage of the PRA, and 10 times after. However, only nine articles included one or
more negative labels in the six months before decriminalization, compared to seven articles
in the six months after.
These frequency counts reveal an interesting trend in the data, but don’t necessarily
speak to the meaning of the terms themselves or the articles in which they appear, or the
intent of the authors. In some cases, it seems clear that the columnist is using a slur to
demean sex workers. For example, columnist Garth George writes, “Mr. Barnett wants to
revolutionize whoredom, making it easier and more profitable for all concerned to
participate in this, the second oldest industry in the world (the first was war and
soldiering).” (George 2003a). George, a conservative Christian, uses the term ‘whoredom’
rather than ‘sex work’ or even ‘prostitution’ to emphasize that the law and its sponsor are
unreasonable.
In other cases, columnists who support decriminalization use slurs to critique the
outmoded views of their opponents. For instance, in an editorial supporting the passage of
the PRA, Diana Witchel mocks the views of those opposed to decriminalization:
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So why the uproar – often from unexpected quarters – about decriminalizing prostitution?
One argument says that it's yet another liberal plot designed to bring down what is left of
Western civilization. The debate drove Rosemary McLeod, in the Sunday Star Times, into
Old Testament mode. She insists on calling a spade a spade and a prostitute a ‘harlot’ and/or
‘whore’. Referring to MP Tim Barnett and the Prostitutes Collective's Catherine Healy,
McLeod thunders, ‘And so their supporters' position becomes that they don't want their
own children to be whores, but they won't stand in the way of other people's children being
so degraded’. In Britain, the normally fairly sisterhood-friendly Guardian columnist Julie
Burchill put it more colourfully, ‘Imagine your own son or daughter (or mother, as most of
them are) making a living out of being a human spittoon’. My favourite Burchill quote on
the matter reveals outrage almost as fierce as McLeod's, ‘When the sex war is won
prostitutes should be shot as collaborators for their terrible betrayal of all women’. Yikes.
(Witchel 2003)

In this article, Witchel uses direct quotes rather than paraphrasing to signal that she does
not share these stigmatizing views. Furthermore, the sarcastic reference to the Old
Testament and the deadpan “yikes” contribute to the journalist’s caricature of her
opponents as regressive and ridiculous. Despite this, Witchel’s stance on the legitimacy of
sex work is complicated; in the same article she writes, “I don’t want any of my children
to grow up to be, um, a ‘sex worker’.” (Witchel 2003). Here, the use of the filler word
“um” – uncommon in written speech – and the quotation marks around the term ‘sex
worker’ imply that Witchel believes sex work to be unsavoury. Paradoxically, in this
article, pejorative epithets like ‘whore’ are used to indicate solidarity with sex workers and
those sponsoring the decriminalization bill, while neutral terms like ‘sex worker’ are used
to express disdain.
As these examples suggest, the meanings of labels are not fixed or innate. However,
as some activists argue, regardless of intent, the use of slurs by those outside the targeted
group is inherently stigmatizing, because these terms contribute to dehumanizing
stereotypes that are harmful to marginalized groups (Muscat 2014). Furthermore, when
newspapers print slurs, these labels have an event greater stigmatizing and oppressive
effect by virtue of the authority and legitimacy afforded to mainstream media in liberal
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democracies. With one exception2, the sex workers quoted in the articles I reviewed don’t
use pejorative labels to refer to themselves, even ironically. Rather, they call themselves
and each other ‘sex workers’, ‘prostitutes’, or ‘girls’.
While certain activists also suggest that the term ‘prostitute’ is itself a slur, I
generally do not consider it as such for the purposes of this analysis. The New Zealand
Prostitutes Collective, the text of the Prostitution Reform Act, and sex workers themselves
all refer to ‘prostitution’, making it difficult to systematically disaggregate cases in which
the term is used descriptively from those in which it is used disparagingly. However, there
are instances in which the label ‘prostitute’ contributes to the stigmatization of sex workers
by associating them with negative stereotypes. On several occasions, a journalist mentions
that an individual is or was a sex worker when there appears to be no journalistic reason to
do so. I call these instances irrelevant associations. In each of these cases, the stories being
reported pertained to illegal or immoral activities; there were no instances of positive
associations in the data. For example, several articles published in The Press and the
Dominion Post describe the case of Christopher Truscott, an intellectually disabled man
who was charged and convicted for criminal nuisance in 1999 for failing to disclose his
HIV status to sexual partners. Despite the fact that Truscott was not arrested or convicted
for solicitation, every article about his case describes him as a “former male prostitute”
(see, for example, Martin 2003). By labeling Truscott as a former sex worker in articles
2

In a profile published after decriminalization, Catherine Healy, National Coordinator of the Prostitutes’
Collective and a former sex worker, comments on the destruction of a sex worker registry maintained by the
police before the passage of the PRA. She is quoted as saying, “Maybe they’ll have a bonfire to burn the list,
which must stretch from one end of Lambton Quay to the top of Mt. Vic by now. The list of all the fallen
women, of all the naughty girls” (Boniface 2003). Healey’s reference to ‘fallen women’ and ‘naughty girls’
is repeated in the headline of the article. In this case, Healy seems to be using the labels facetiously to scoff
at the fact that the police force once felt the need to keep tabs on sex workers; her reference to a bonfire
implies celebration, and underscores her relief that the lengthy and ridiculous list will be destroyed. I did not
include Healy’s use of labels in my frequency counts.
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about risky behavior and unsafe sex, the articles contribute to the stigmatizing view that
sex workers carry disease and willingly put clients and the general public at risk.
In another example, in August 2003, The Press reported that a missing woman
might have been killed by a local gang. The newspaper wrote:
A Dunedin woman missing for more than eight months may have met her death in
Christchurch’s gang underworld, police fear. Tuitania Marama McIntosh, a former
prostitute known to have drug addictions, left behind her former partner and their two
young sons when she disappeared in November 2002. […] Christchurch and Dunedin
detectives trying to track down Ms. McIntosh say they have strong leads suggesting she
had arrived in Christchurch at some point and linked with a local gang. Before her
disappearance it appeared Ms. McIntosh had put her troubled past behind her and was
forging a life with her partner and their sons. ‘From all accounts she got off drugs and had
given up prostitution. Whether or not the birth of her last child had an effect on her we
can’t discount’, Dunedin Detective Sergeant Stephen McGregor said. (Booker 2003)

In this example, both the journalist and the police officer make reference to the victim’s
history of sex work despite there being no clear link to her disappearance. The officer
quoted says as much by clarifying that McIntosh was no longer involved in the sex
industry, and suggesting post-partum depression as an alternate explanation for her
disappearance. Nevertheless, using the label ‘former prostitute’ in this story reinforces
stereotypical beliefs that sex workers are irresponsible drug users, willing to abandon their
families in order to join criminal organizations.
In a final example, the Dominion Post reported in September 2003 that the Court
of Appeal was due to deliver in a verdict in the high-profile appeal of David Bain, who was
convicted in 1995 of murdering his parents and three siblings. In a discussion of the
prosecution’s alternative account of the crime, the columnist noted that Bain’s attorneys
“have since produced many affidavits and other evidence that [Bain’s father] may have
killed his family because [his daughter] Laniet, a prostitute, was about to reveal that he had
been committing incest with her” (McLoughlin 2003). Whether Laniet was or was not a

33

sex worker is irrelevant to her claim of abuse. Here, the inclusion of the label ‘prostitute’,
coupled with the euphemistic description of alleged sexual abuse as ‘committing incest
with her’, pollutes Laniet’s identity as a victim and casts doubt on the accuracy of any
testimony she could otherwise have given. Although irrelevant associations occurred both
before and after decriminalization, they occurred far more frequently before the passage of
the PRA. In the pre-legislation period, there were 12 newspaper articles published which
include at least one association of the label ‘prostitute’ with unrelated events, compared to
only six articles in the post-legislation period.
Stereotyping occurs frequently in the articles I reviewed, and not only through the
irrelevant application of the ‘prostitute’ label. The most frequent stereotypes that appear in
the sample pertain to criminality and drug use. Nearly a third of the sampled articles
contained references to drugs or criminal behaviour. Journalists and their sources often
expressed the belief that brothels were run by organized crime or gangs, or that most sex
workers abuse drugs. Other common stereotypes include the claim that sex work spreads
disease and damages mental health, the belief that most sex workers were abused as
children, and the view that sex work is equivalent to sex trafficking. These stereotypes are
well documented in broader literatures about the stigma of sex work (see, for example,
Abel and Fitzgerald 2010; Armstrong 2018; Ryan et al. 2019). Often, columnists or sources
presented stereotypical views in a patronizing or paternalistic tone, reinforcing the image
of sex workers as damaged and further diminishing their agency. For example, Member of
Parliament Gordon Copeland portrayed his opposition to the PRA as a personal quest to
protect helpless sex workers from the evils of an exploitative industry dominated by gangs:
“At least I would have the satisfaction of doing what I can to try and mitigate the very, very

34

negative effects which would arise from decriminalizing prostitution, procuring and
brothel-keeping because I believe those activities will largely be controlled by gangs and
that the poor old prostitutes will work for them on pretty thin commissions and I think
that’s exploitation bordering on slavery” (Anon 2003b). Copeland’s use of the term
‘slavery’ also evokes the racialized ‘white slavery’ anti-trafficking rhetoric of the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries (Dalley 2000), as well as ‘modern day slavery’
framings that persist in contemporary anti-trafficking movements (Beutin 2017).
Separation
Link and Phelan define separation as a cognitive and expressive process through
which labels and stereotypes contribute to a sense of separation of ‘us’ from ‘them’. In the
sample, I noted several instances in which individuals associated with the sex industry were
referred to as fundamentally different types of people than ordinary New Zealanders. For
instance, in April 2003, MP Gordon Copeland argued during a vote on the PRA:
“Parliament should proceed with great care on this issue. I think most New Zealanders are
bright enough to figure out the kind of person who will be attracted to the business of
pimping or brothel-keeping. Let’s be frank – they are people who are prepared to exploit
young women for sordid monetary gain” (Anon 2003b). Copeland conflates brothel owners
with “pimps”, and creates a strong discursive opposition between managers and ‘ordinary
people’ who are able to recognize their “sordid” motivations. In another example, the New
Zealand Herald reported on the challenges facing police in solving the murder of Sheryl
Brown, a homeless woman whose body was found in an Auckland red light district:
“[Detectives] said the investigation was difficult because the type of people who frequented
the Karangahape Road area ‘don’t want to be identified for a number of reasons’” (Gower
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2003). Here, the detective implies that there is something shameful about frequenting redlight districts, and that the “type of people” who do are so eager to avoid police or public
notice that they would refuse to assist in a murder investigation without incentive.
As these examples illustrate, in some cases, the separation of ‘us’ and ‘them’ is
achieved through direct discursive identification of “the kind of person” or “types of
people” who become involved in the sex industry, solicit a sex worker, or frequent redlight districts (Anon 2003b). In other cases, separation occurred more subtly, through the
juxtaposition of a polluted group – prostitutes and their clients – with reputable citizens
(Gower 2003; Moore 2003). However, in my sample, the most common form of separation
involved the discursive opposition between sex workers and a speaker or writer’s family,
most often a daughter. Many Members of Parliament argued against the Prostitution
Reform Act on the grounds that they and their constituents would not want their children
to be sex workers. For example, in an interview with the Herald, MP Craig McNair said,
“I just have to put myself in the shoes of a parent and I wouldn’t want my children to go
into that industry” (Mold 2003). In a speech before Parliament, MP Larry Baldock
declared, “I would be happy for my daughter to work as a barmaid; I would not be happy
for my daughter to spread her legs and be a prostitute” (Watkins 2003). Member of
Parliament Clayton Cosgrove said, “I have taken a lot of soundings from folk in the
community on both sides of the argument and I have made my decision. I don’t want to be
confronted by parents who say my son or daughter has decided to embark on a unique
career opportunity thanks in part to you” (Watkins 2003). And MP Harry Duynhoven
remarked, “Like many of us, I would be horrified if one of my children said, ‘Dad, this is
what I want to do with my life’” (Anon 2003c).
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By using phrases such as “like many of us”, the speakers position themselves as
members of an “us” group of concerned citizens. In these examples, the parliamentarians
reinforce a sense of separation between sex workers, a defiled group who “spread their
legs” for paying customers, and members of their own families. Furthermore, although the
speakers would undoubtedly reject sex work as a legitimate occupation for all of their
family members, they focus exclusively on their children, and their daughters in particular.
This

emphasis

on

female

children

highlights

the

binary

oppositions

of

innocence/corruption and virginity/promiscuity that underpin the stigma of sex work.
There was no significant change in the frequency of discursive separation after
decriminalization. I noted 25 instances of separation in 20 articles in the six months
preceding the passage of the PRA, and 27 instances in 19 articles in the six months
following.
Discrimination
Link and Phelan identify discrimination as the final component of stigma. The
inclusion of discrimination is crucial to a sociological understanding of stigma; it extends
the concept from the cognitive and interpersonal realms to the social, structural, and
institutional spheres. Media analysis does not allow for an exhaustive assessment of
discrimination, as countless instances of unequal treatment are unfortunately not deemed
newsworthy. However, my newspaper data does clearly suggest that the passage of the
Prostitution Reform Act enabled a new form of discrimination against sex workers through
the development of harsh local bylaws. In this final empirical section, I suggest that the
development of discriminatory bylaws was an unanticipated consequence of national law
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reform (Merton 1936). I offer these preliminary findings as a promising avenue for future
research.
Prior to decriminalization, the illicit nature of sex work put those involved in the
sex industry at risk for discrimination. Sex workers feared that a conviction for solicitation
could jeopardize their relationships with employers or landlords, many of whom require a
background check as a precondition of employment or housing (Jordan 2003). The passage
of the Prostitution Reform Act reduced discrimination associated with criminal
convictions. Solicitation laws were repealed, so sex workers no longer feared that new
criminal convictions would jeopardize their employment, housing, or financial prospects.
New Zealand also pursued legislative reform to allow individuals who had been convicted
of decriminalized offenses such as homosexuality or prostitution to have these convictions
expunged from their records (Government of New Zealand 2004). However, while some
provisions of the PRA directly reduced discrimination, others indirectly enabled new forms
of discrimination at the local level. Specifically, Sections 12, 13, and 14 granted powers to
local councils to regulate the location and signage of brothels. Some municipalities would
use this new authority in ways that contravened the spirit and the letter of the new
decriminalization law.
Even before the Act was ratified, local governing bodies began to explore ways to
mitigate the effects of decriminalization on municipalities. Most city councils recognized
that completely banning sex work would be impossible, so focused on drafting bylaws that
restricted sex work to certain areas under Section 14 of the PRA (Orsman 2003b; Powley
2003). The majority of these bylaws stipulated that sex work could not take place within
250 meters of a school of place of worship; some also banned brothels entirely from
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residential areas. The stated rationale for these types of regulations was to protect citizens
from exposure to harmful or offensive activities (Orsman 2003a). Other common
approaches to regulation banned sex work from historic areas and tourist attractions.
Councillors argued that sex work pollutes a city’s image; they tried to mitigate
contamination by segregating sex workers from areas of symbolic importance. Two such
bylaws, in Auckland and Christchurch, were found to contravene the PRA and were
eventually struck down by the High Court of New Zealand (Willowford Family Trust and
Brown v. Christchurch City Council 2005; JB International Ltd v. Auckland City Council
2006).
Media reports suggest that the development of discriminatory municipal bylaws
occurred only after the passage of the Prostitution Reform Act. Prior to the approval of the
Act, the location of brothels was subject to the Massage Parlours Act (MPA) of 1978. The
MPA regulated the location and function of massage parlors, not brothels. However, “the
introduction of the legal concept of massage parlors in the 1978 Massage Parlors Act
enabled a state-endorsed sex industry to operate behind the facade of a superficially
innocent massage activity” (Barnett 2007:1). In administering the MPA, local councils
routinely disregarded issues like proximity to schools, neighbourhood character, and the
like – issues that would become central to the regulation of brothels in the wake of the
Prostitution Reform Act. In some cases, the same city councillors who had initially
approved the location of brothels before decriminalization were responsible for drafting
discriminatory bylaws following the passage of the PRA (Rudman 2003). The reduction of
structural stigma at the national level through decriminalization seems to have created new
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and surprising opportunities for stigmatization at the local level. This relationship between
decriminalization and municipal bylaws merits further study.

Conclusion
The law is more than a system of rules backed by threats; it also exerts significant
symbolic power to delineate the boundaries of citizenship. Regulatory regimes governing
sex work reflect normative assumptions about the acceptability and respectability of sex
workers. By removing all criminal laws pertaining to the sale or purchase of sexual
services, full decriminalization is necessary for the reduction and eventual elimination of
sex work stigma. In these environments, media representations of sex work play an integral
role in shaping public discourse. Under decriminalization, media outlets define the terms
of acceptable sex work, partially fulfilling a role previously played by the criminal justice
system. Although the decriminalization model relies on the fewest stigmatizing
assumptions about sex work, it is no guarantee of social acceptance. It can take years for
public opinion and social norms to fully catch up to the law, and scholars have documented
persistent sex work stigma in New Zealand nearly two decades after the passage of the
Prostitution Reform Act. Nevertheless, recent work on the implications of same sex
marriage law in the United States has shown that perceived norms are significantly and
immediately responsive to legal changes. Are media representations similarly responsive?
In this paper, I asked: How does decriminalization influence media representations
of sex work? I focused specifically on the impact of New Zealand’s 2003 Prostitution
Reform Act; the closeness of the vote and the scope of the reforms make the passage of
this law a crucial hinge event embedded within a longer-term process of decriminalization
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in New Zealand. Using Link and Phelan’s four components of stigma as a conceptual
frame, I undertook a comparative analysis of portrayals of sex work and sex workers in
New Zealand’s three largest newspapers in the six months preceding and six months
following the passage of the vote. I found that decriminalization was associated with a
decrease in labelling and stereotyping, but no change in separation. Furthermore, although
my data did not permit a conclusive analysis of discrimination, I presented preliminary
findings to suggest that the passage of the PRA resulted in a significant and immediate
increase in discriminatory municipal regulations. Although the national decriminalization
law precluded more overt forms of discrimination in housing or employment, it also
indirectly enabled discriminatory zoning at the local level.
This study makes a number of conceptual and methodological contributions to
literatures on sex work stigma and media representations. Conceptually, I adopted the
systems approach to the study of stigma proposed by Ryan, Nambiar, and Ferguson (2019)
to explore a potential relationship between structural destigmatization through law reform
and symbolic stigma in media. I also used Link and Phelan’s (2001) components of stigma
to frame my qualitative content analysis. Clearly, this is not the only way to document
stigma in representations. However, Link and Phelan’s approach is well-established in the
stigma literature, and this disaggregated approach allows for stigmatization representations
to vary in degree as well as in kind. This proved important in my study, as I found labelling
and stereotyping decreased, separation stayed constant, and certain forms of discrimination
increased.
Methodologically, my study is innovative in several regards. First, to my
knowledge, it is the first to apply the framework of eventful analysis to the study of sex
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work decriminalization. In a significant departure from existing research on media
representations on sex work, I treat the passage of the Prostitution Reform Act as a critical
juncture, and measure stigmatizing representations before and after. My study differs from
existing research on media representations of sex work in that it is directly comparative,
holds the length of the pre- and post-implementation periods constant, analyzes
representations immediately following the passage of the law, and significantly restricts
the period of study. This research design does not allow me to speak to the long-term
evolution of media representations over time. However, it complements existing work by
problematizing the assumption of cultural lag and shedding light on the ways in which
media representations of sex work changed at a crucial moment in New Zealand’s history.
This paper raises several promising avenues for future research. First, although I
observed changes in the nature and degree of stigma in media representations in the period
immediately following decriminalization, it remains to be seen whether and how these
changes persisted over time. My analysis could be repeated with a longer postimplementation period of study, or with multiple six-month snapshots over time. Second,
although media representations of sex work are an essential component of the cultural
landscape, public opinion and social norms also play an important role. Future studies
could incorporate complementary data sources such as public opinion polls in order to
investigate the relationship between media discourses and other indicators of public and
cultural attitudes toward sex work. Finally, my preliminary findings suggest that
decriminalization was correlated with a sharp increase in discriminatory bylaws. It seems
that in New Zealand, a reduction in structural stigma at the national level inadvertently
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enabled an increase in structural stigma at the local level. Additional research should
investigate this unanticipated consequence.
Fully destigmatizing sex work is a complex task that will likely be the work of
decades. Although the passage of the Prostitution Reform Act certainly did not eliminate
stigma against sex workers, there were noticeable differences in media portrayals of sex
work in major newspapers immediately following the passage of the law These changing
representations offer evidence of the symbolic power of legal events to delineate the
bounds of citizenship.
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Chapter 3
“Tyranny of a Slim Majority”: Democracy Frames and Backlash
against Narrow Legislative Victories
Introduction
In August 2005, as part of its campaign platform, New Zealand’s centre-right
opposition party United Future announced a policy whereby any parliamentary decision
receiving less than a 60 percent majority would be subject to an automatic citizens’
referendum. In a press release, Party Leader John Dunne argued, “laws which significantly
impact on the social and constitutional direction of our country are too easily foisted upon
us by groups whose views simply do not accord with those held by the majority of New
Zealanders. Changes are needed so that citizens can be confident that the views of the
majority are reflected in the laws enacted by Parliament” (United Future 2005a). Dunne
was particularly concerned about two laws – the Prostitution Reform Act (PRA), which
passed by one vote in the House of Representatives in June 2003, and the Supreme Court
Act (SCA), which passed by three votes in December of the same year. These laws, which
pertained to significant moral and constitutional questions, were controversial and
provoked a backlash, mainly from opposition parties and special interest groups. In both
cases, opponents attempted to prevent the implementation of the legislation through
popular referendum, though their efforts were ultimately unsuccessful. In addition to the
substantive content of the laws, stakeholders objected strongly to the circumstances of their
passage: the closeness of the votes was a major point of contention in both referendum
campaigns.
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In this paper, I analyze the backlash to the Prostitution Reform Act and Supreme
Court Act in order to illustrate how closeness informed opposition messaging. I analyze
parliamentary transcripts, press releases, and newspaper coverage of both laws and their
respective referendum campaigns to suggest that vote margin played an important role in
backlash against the legislation by creating conditions in which opponents could challenge
the legitimacy of the vote. In New Zealand, opposition discourse centred on portraying the
votes on the PRA and SCA as fundamentally undemocratic. In particular, stakeholders
emphasized themes of public participation and support, as well as politics and ideology in
challenging the legitimacy of these narrow legal victories.
In the first section, I identify major gaps in existing literatures on law and social
change and backlash. Next, I introduce my case studies, data, and method. In the third
section, I present findings from my analysis of transcripts, press releases and newspapers.
I conclude by reviewing the argument and offering some avenues for future research.

Theorizing Backlash
For decades, activists, policymakers, and public interest lawyers have appealed to
the law to bring about widescale social transformation. From the passage of women’s
suffrage, to the enactment of civil rights and anti-discrimination legislation, to landmark
legal victories in cases such as Brown v. Board of Education, history is rife with examples
of successful legal mobilization. However, while the relationship between law and social
change is a central sociolegal question, scholars disagree as to whether the law is an
effective means of social transformation, at both structural and attitudinal levels.
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Some scholars draw on examples like the US Civil Rights Act to contend that the
law can act as both a rule-shifter and a culture-shifter (Stoddard 1997). Scholars of legal
mobilization point out that the judiciary can provide a voice for marginalized groups who
may lack representation in the political system (Kessler 1990; Scheingold 2004; Zemans
1983). McCann (1994, 1996) notes that even in the absence of formal legal victories, the
law can indirectly further social movement aims. For instance, drawing on his research into
the American movement for pay equity reform, he argues that although unions played a
crucial role in securing reform, “unions themselves are to a large extent legal constructs,
and legal battles have been crucial to union development and vitality” (1996:470). Not only
do legal struggles play an important consciousness-raising function for social movements,
but legal norms and concepts like equality and rights also form the basis of their collective
action frames (McCann 1996; Snow and Benford 1992). Finally, political scientists have
explored the effects of legal victories on public opinion. For instance, Tankard and Paluck
(2017) conducted a survey experiment of perceived norms and personal attitudes toward
marriage equality immediately after the Supreme Court legalized same-sex marriage in
Obergefell v. Hodges (2015). They found “strong evidence that an institutional decision
can change people’s social norm perceptions – perceptions of what the public believes and
what the public will believe in the future” (2017:1342). This is significant given that how
an individual perceives the norms and beliefs of others strongly predicts their own
behaviour.
Others are more skeptical of the law’s transformative potential. As Matt Coles,
Director of the ACLU’s Lesbian and Gay Rights Project, explained to the New York Times,
“[W]e’re unprepared for the consequences of winning. Winning in court too soon could
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mean losing in the court of public opinion, in Congress, and under the United States
Constitution” (qtd. Penn 2009:36). This intuition is well substantiated in the literature,
where scholars have documented a so-called backlash effect of legal reform. Price and
Keck neatly summarize the backlash hypothesis: “social movements should avoid reliance
on judicial politics because such strategies will be ineffective at best and counterproductive
at worst; in other words, they will often spark political countermobilization that will set the
movement further back than when it started (2014:5).
There is an extensive empirical literature documenting the backlash effect of laws
pertaining to civil rights (Rosenberg 2008; Stoddard 1997), reproductive rights
(Greenhouse and Siegel 2011; Post and Siegel 2007; Ziegler 2014), gay marriage (Bishin
et al. 2016), eminent domain (Somin 2009), and the death penalty (Mandery 2013; Somin
2009), among other issues. For example, in his pathbreaking book, The Hollow Hope,
Gerald Rosenberg (2008) traces the direct and indirect effects of landmark American
Supreme Court decisions in Brown v. Board of Education and Roe v. Wade, concluding
that significant social transformation through litigation is nearly impossible. In another
example that illustrates the far-reaching unanticipated consequences of law reform,
Stoddard (1997) explains how one favourable ruling on marriage equality by the State
Supreme Court of Hawaii ultimately set back the national movement for gay rights. After
the Court ruled in Baehr v. Lewin that the equal protection clause of the state’s constitution
would compel the state to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples, conservative
legislators in other states quickly passed legislation that would bar the recognition of outof-state same-sex marriage licenses, even though no such license had yet to be issued.
Hawaii’s ruling gained national attention, and ultimately contributed to the passage of the
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federal Defense of Marriage Act, which legally defined marriage as a union between one
man and one woman, effectively barring same-sex couples from accessing federal benefits.
As this example illustrates, legal rulings often provoke significant backlash at the political
and institutional levels. Furthermore, political scientists have explored the potential for
public opinion backlash (Haider-Markel and Meier 2003). Although evidence of an
attitudinal backlash to law reform is mixed, scholars have found that the mere assumption
that the passage of a law will provoke an outcry from constituents can jeopardize
progressive politics (Bishin et al. 2016).
Clearly, the question of whether the law is an effective means of social
transformation is unsettled, and evidence in support of the backlash hypothesis is mixed.
However, regardless of the specific conclusions drawn by the authors cited above, there
exist major empirical and conceptual gaps in the literatures on law and social change, and
on backlash more specifically. First, the empirical focus of this scholarship is
predominantly American. To a certain extent, this is unsurprising given its intellectual
origins in the Law and Society Movement, a tradition of sociolegal scholarship founded in
American universities in the mid-1960s and initially funded by the US-based Russell Sage
Foundation (Silbey 2002:861). However, the focus on American state and federal cases
also informs the broader theoretical arguments advanced about the nature and scope of
social transformation. The United States is a unique political system with a singular
political culture. Several features of the American case – the interplay between levels and
branches of government, an active judiciary in a common law system, a robust system of
direct democracy, and a stable two-party system – shape the path of legal mobilization and
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the social consequences of law reform3. In short, though the backlash literature purports to
speak to the broad relationship between law and society, in fact, it speaks mainly to the
specific relationship between American law and American society. Additional empirical
research is needed to explore the dynamics of legal mobilization and backlash in other
countries.
The second major gap in the law and social change and backlash literatures is the
disproportionate focus on judicial rulings. Scholars hypothesize that legislative decisions
will have different social effects than judicial verdicts; they are expected to provoke less
backlash due to the perceived legitimacy of the legislative as compared to the judicial
branch (Flores and Barclay 2016:46; Stoddard 1997). This thesis rests on the issue of
representation: because the legislature claims to speak for constituents, these constituents
are likely to perceive its decisions as more legitimate than those emanating from an
appointed judiciary. Nevertheless, few studies systematically explore the social
consequences of legislation. This likely partially reflects the predominance of American
empirical cases, since the active role of the judiciary means that legal mobilization efforts
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First, the federal system means that the states enjoy a great deal of autonomy, and can and do pass laws that
undermine or challenge federal legislation (Mandery 2013; Somin 2009). On the other hand, as in the case
of same-sex marriage, action at the state level can also provoke a federal response. These dynamics are by
no means common to all nation-states, or even to all federations. Second, because the United States employs
a common law system largely based on precedent, judges play a significant role in determining legal
outcomes through their interpretation of case law. This is not the case in codified civil law systems.
Furthermore, the American judicial branch is very active, even among common law countries, with an
extensive network of appellate, circuit, and district courts issuing thousands of rulings each year (IAALS
2020). In comparison, prior to the passage of the Supreme Court Act in 2003, New Zealand had no domestic
superior court, relying instead on appeals to the British Privy Council. In the decade prior to the creation of
the Supreme Court, the Privy Council issued only 21 decisions regarding New Zealand (Advisory Group on
the Privy Council 2002). Third, the United States has a robust system of direct democracy at the federal,
state, and municipal levels. The initiative process offers an important avenue for social change, as voters
must not depend solely on the legislative or judicial branches for reform, and the initiative is often used to
address deep social or moral issues. Finally, America’s entrenched two-party system means that the
relationship between the parties is adversarial and generally inflexible – by definition, one party is always in
opposition. In parliamentary systems with more political parties, there is a greater possibility of coalition
building, and political alliances can be unpredictable and subject to change (Giannetti and Benoit 2009).

49

will almost always end up in court. Those studies that do include a focus on the legislative
branch typically look at legislation as part of a broader story about the evolution of a
particular social movement, a story that almost always includes court victories and/or ballot
measures (see, for example: Hillyard and Dombrink 2001; McCann 1994)
Third, studies of backlash that adopt a macrohistorical approach can suffer from
conceptual imprecision – what exactly is backlash? For the most part, studies of public
opinion backlash tend to explicitly define their terms for the purposes of operationalizing
their variables. This level of definitional precision is common in the public opinion
literature because the object of analysis – opinion as measured with surveys – is granular
and the temporal focus is relatively short. On the other hand, studies that take a more
macrohistorical approach to the evolution of various sociolegal issues – McCann’s study
of the movement for equal pay, for instance, or Stoddard’s account of the origins of the
Defense of Marriage Act – tend to leave the definition of backlash largely implicit. Because
these studies offer historical accounts of social movement struggles over many years or
even decades, they prioritize major events to reconstruct a narrative of social change. They
emphasize passed legislation, or major protests, or initiatives that successfully qualify for
the ballot. They may not include cases dismissed by the court, ballot measures that fail to
collect the requisite number of signatures, or legislation that does not move beyond the
committee stage. In short, they focus on what does happen, not what doesn’t. This tendency
to focus on major or “successful” events is compounded by the fact that this scholarship is
dependent on archival materials and the recollection of interviewees, data sources which
may inadvertently prioritize only the most memorable campaigns or events. Whatever the
cause, the implication is that backlash requires a certain threshold of opposition, which
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obscures movements that fail to secure this critical mass. However, I argue that peripheral
opposition movements, failed repeal efforts, or unsuccessful political initiatives can reveal
a great deal about the social consequences of law. Broadening the focus to include failed
as well as successful opposition movements reconceptualizes backlash as a dynamic
process, rather than a sequence of major outcomes.
If backlash is conceived of as a process rather than a teleological sequence of
outcomes, we can study it using analytical concepts from scholarship on social movements,
especially frames. As Goffman (1986) notes, frames are schemas that individuals use to
identify and interpret events in their lives and in their broader society. By making events
meaningful, frames guide individual and collective action. Benford and Snow extend
Goffman’s work on framing by developing the concept of collective action frames, which
render social events meaningful for the purpose of mobilizing supporters and demobilizing
opponents. Collective action frames are “action-oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that
inspire and legitimate the activities and campaigns of a social movement organization”
(Benford and Snow 2000:614). Some collective action frames are broad enough to inform
the activities of multiple movements; these master frames often rely on powerful appeals
to fundamental values. Examples of master frames include rights (Hull 2001), choice
(Davies 1999), injustice (Gamson et al. 1992), and a return to democracy (Noonan 1995).
Social movement scholars have applied frame analysis to backlash, but generally only in
cases in which opposition is so significant that it becomes a distinct counter-movement.
For example, the pro-life movement is analyzed as a social movement unto itself, rather
than as a backlash to the expansion of reproductive rights (Rohlinger 2002). I suggest that
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frame analysis can be productively applied to all cases of backlash, even those that fail to
reach critical mass or converge into counter-movements.
Finally, beyond distinguishing between legislative and judicial decisions, the
backlash literature overlooks the circumstances of a law’s passage as a potential source of
opposition. To my knowledge, no studies in sociology, legal studies, or political science
have identified vote margin as a potentially salient factor in explaining backlash to
legislative decisions. This would be a natural extension of existing work that theorizes the
conditions under which a law is likely to be an effective means of behavioural or social
change, as it hinges on the issue of perceived legitimacy (Weber 1964). For example, Tom
Tyler and Yuen Huo (2002) argue that people are more likely to respect legal authorities
and comply with their orders when they believe that these authority figures have acted
fairly. This perceived fairness grants legitimacy to legal actors, which fosters compliance
with the law and trust in the legal system (Tyler 1990). For his part, Stoddard (1997) centres
legitimacy in explaining divergent legislative and judicial outcomes at the societal rather
than individual level. He explains that if the law is to be an effective tool of social
transformation, it must shift not only the formal rules regulating behaviour, but also a
society’s underlying norms and values. For a law to be a “culture-shifter”, it must be seen
as valid – even if citizens do not agree with a law’s substantive content, they must believe
that the law itself is legitimate. For Stoddard, legitimacy is derived from the source of the
law, which explains why, at best, judicial verdicts often fail to significantly transform
social norms, and, at worst, provoke a significant backlash (see also Rosenberg 2008).
Because judges are appointed rather than elected, judicial decisions are often perceived as
“illegitimate, high handed and undemocratic – [acts] of arrogance by the […] philosopher-
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kings sitting on the Court” (Stoddard 1997:997). On the other hand, Stoddard claims that
laws that emanate from an elected legislative branch are more likely to be seen as the will
of the people, which grants them greater legitimacy (985). Close votes also raise the issue
of legitimacy. These votes seem particularly contingent: because they pass or fail by
narrow margins, there is a sense that, but for this or that factor, things could have gone the
other way. Close votes are precarious and suspenseful, as evidenced by the metaphors we
use to describe them – a cliffhanger, the razor’s edge, hanging in the balance. This precarity
troubles the outcome of the vote; the question may have been formally decided, but the
narrow margin opens a liminal space in which opponents can challenge the legitimacy of
the decision. The automatic recount, in which margins are so narrow the results cannot be
finalized until each vote is counted again, illustrates this dynamic. The recount is an
institutional mechanism, triggered at a set margin, that is designed to reassure voters of the
legitimacy of the results and preclude opposition challenges. Although the set margins at
which an automatic recount is triggered give the impression that there is some objective
standard of closeness, I contend that closeness is always constructed.
In this paper, I analyze backlash to the Prostitution Reform Act (2003) and the
Supreme Court Act (2003), which passed narrowly in New Zealand’s 47th Parliament. I
define backlash broadly as shared negative reactions to changes in the status quo (Lipset
and Raab 1970; Sanbonmatsu 2008). This definition assumes that backlash is not an
individual phenomenon, but deliberately does not specify the scope, significance, or
duration of negative reactions. My empirical focus extends the backlash literature in several
ways: my cases are non-American, the laws emanated from the legislative branch and were
not challenged in the courts, and the repeal efforts, which were largely concentrated to
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elites and never reached critical mass in the broader public, ultimately failed. These cases
bring to the fore the ways in which backlash is shaped by social and political forces.
Political dynamics are especially important in unsuccessful legislative backlash
movements; because they fail to gain traction with the broader public, these movements
are largely confined to the political sphere. I argue that vote margin played an important
role in the backlash against the Prostitution Reform and Supreme Court Acts by creating
conditions in which opponents could question the legitimacy of the votes. Political elites
and special interest groups strategically used the closeness of the votes to frame both
process and outcome as fundamentally undemocratic.

Case Studies, Data, and Method
Before turning to the specifics of my case studies, some background on New
Zealand’s system of government and the 47th Parliament is needed. New Zealand uses a
Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) voting system, in which each citizen gets two votes
– a party vote, and an electoral vote. The party vote decides the number of seats in
Parliament held by each party; for example, a party receiving 30 percent of the party vote
will hold roughly 30 percent of seats in the House of Representatives. The electoral vote
decides who will become an electorate Member of Parliament (MP). The House of
Representatives has 120 seats, the majority of which are held by electorate MPs. The
remaining seats are filled by list MPs, drawn from ranked lists of candidates compiled by
each party. Under MMP, it is extremely rare for one party to win enough of the party vote
to form a majority government; the winning party must enter into coalition or confidenceand-supply agreements with other parties to form a government or pass legislation
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(Institute for Government 2017). MMP replaced the First Past the Post (FPP) system4 in
1993 following a Royal Commission and binding popular referendum.5
In New Zealand, referenda may be citizen-initiated or government-mandated, and
the results are almost always non-binding. Under the 1993 Citizens’ Initiated Referenda
Act, a non-binding referendum can be held on any question that receives the signed support
of 10 percent of registered voters. As of 2020, only five of 48 petitions collected sufficient
signatures to appear on the ballot (Roberts 2020). The 1993 Electoral Act stipulates that
referenda must be conducted for issues of electoral procedure, including the voting age and
method of voting, unless legislation passes by a 75 percent majority in the House of
Representatives (Goverment of New Zealand 1993:268). However, the same Royal
Commission that led to the adoption of MMP also recommended that binding referenda be
used in cases of major constitutional reform or significant conscience issues (Mapp
1995:446), though this recommendation has not been consistently applied.
During the 47th Parliament (2002-2005), Prime Minister Helen Clark led the centreleft Labour Party in a coalition government with the leftist Progressive Party. The coalition
was backed by a confidence-and-supply agreement6 with centre-right United Future. The

4

In a First Past the Post system, each citizen votes directly for the candidate they want to represent their
geographic constituency; the candidate with the most votes becomes the MP for that electorate, even if they
failed to win an absolute majority of votes cast.
5
First Past the Post tends to strongly disadvantage small parties, and can result in situations in which a party
wins an election despite failing to receive a plurality of the popular vote. Since the 1930s, New Zealand
politics were dominated by strong majority Labour and National governments, with criticism of FPP
intensifying in the late 1970s and early 1980s. After Labour failed to secure the seats necessary to form a
government despite winning the popular vote in 1978 and 1981, the party promised to establish a Royal
Commission to explore electoral reform. A Labour victory in 1984 saw the establishment of the Royal
Commission on the Electoral System, which recommended the adoption of MMP in 1986. In a 1992
referendum, voters were asked if they supported electoral reform, and to select an alternative voting system.
In 1993, in a second referendum, 54 percent of citizens voted to replace FPP with MMP (Mapp 1995).
6
In a confidence-and-supply agreement, a party promises to support the governing party or coalition in
motions critical to the survival of the government – specifically those of confidence, appropriation, or budget.
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centre-right National Party formed the official opposition. Other parties included New
Zealand First (nationalist populist), ACT New Zealand (right-wing libertarian), Green
Party (leftist), and Maori Party (centre-left, established July 2004) (Library of Parliament
2002).
Backlash against the Prostitution Reform Act and the Supreme Court Act
The Prostitution Reform Act (PRA) fully decriminalized sex work at the national
level. Prior to the passage of the Act, selling sex was not, in itself, illegal, though all related
activities were criminalized. The bill, drafted in consultation with the New Zealand
Prostitutes’ Collective, was based on a harm minimization approach that aimed to protect
the rights and promote the health and safety of sex workers (Abel et al. 2010). The bill was
designated a conscience vote, meaning that Members of Parliament would not be bound by
party affiliation in supporting or rejecting the bill. The PRA passed on June 25, 2003, in a
vote of 60 for, 59 against, and one abstention. The country’s first Muslim MP, Ashraf
Choudhury, abstained, citing moral and religious concerns; his decision was integral to the
approval of the Act as a tied vote would have resulted in the bill’s defeat.
In 2004, the United Future party launched a campaign to repeal the Prostitution
Reform Act through citizen’s-initiated referendum. With the support of Christian think
tank The Maxim Group, one of the strongest and most vocal opponents of
decriminalization, United Future organized a Repeal Week in Auckland timed to
correspond to the one-year anniversary of the bill (Anon 2004b). The goal was to collect
310,000 signatures on a petition that would place the question, “Do you believe the

However, cooperating parties to confidence-and-supply agreements are free to vote against government
motions on conscience or legislative votes (Paun and Hibben 2017).
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Prostitution Reform Act should be repealed?” on the ballot for the 2005 general election.
Ultimately, the repeal campaign was unable to collect the requisite number of signatures
for a citizens’ referendum, and the Prostitution Reform Act remains in Force.
The Supreme Court Act (SCA) abolished the right of appeal to the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council of the United Kingdom7 and established a national
Supreme Court of New Zealand. The Supreme Court Bill’s primary objective was to
expand access to justice. The Judicial Committee heard an average of only 11 appeals from
New Zealand each year; the proposed national Supreme Court would hear an expected 50
cases annually, and would drastically reduce the costs associated with filing an appeal
(Government of New Zealand 2002b). A secondary objective of the legislation was to
symbolically assert national sovereignty by severing an important link to New Zealand’s
colonial past. Unlike the Prostitution Reform Act, which was designated a conscience vote,
the Supreme Court Act was a whipped, or party, vote. In other words, MPs were expected
to vote en bloc in accordance with the wishes of party leadership8. The Government
maintained that the Supreme Court Act was largely a procedural matter and should
therefore be decided by a normal parliamentary vote. Opponents disagreed, claiming that
the proposal amounted to a significant constitutional change, and should thus be subject to
a popular referendum.

7

The Judicial Committee was originally the highest court of appeal for the British Empire, and today fulfills
that role for UK overseas territories and dependencies, as well as some Commonwealth countries (Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council 2020). New Zealand was the last of the former Dominions to retain the right
of appeal.
8
While party members can technically break ranks on a whipped vote, this is extremely rare, as it signals a
major break with party leadership. Members who cross the floor typically face serious consequences,
including losing a portfolio or Cabinet position, or being ejected from caucus.
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Unlike in the case of the Prostitution Reform Act, where opponents used a citizens’
referendum to put pressure on Parliament to repeal the Act only after it was adopted,
opponents to the Supreme Court Act attempted to use a referendum before the legislation
was passed to prevent its eventual implementation. While the Bill was before the select
committee, ACT Member of Parliament Stephen Franks proposed an amendment that
stipulated that the legislation could not come into force until it had been approved by a bare
majority of voters in a binding referendum (ACT New Zealand 2003a). This amendment
was rejected by a majority of Justice and Electoral Select Committee members. Following
this loss, in July 2003, ACT sponsored an attempt by Auckland lawyer Dennis Gates to
collect sufficient signatures to qualify a citizens’ initiative on the question, “Should all
rights of appeal to the Privy Council be abolished?” (ACT New Zealand 2003b). Although
the results of this referendum would be non-binding, opponents to the SCA hoped that a
successful initiative would send a strong rebuke to the Government and push them to
reconsider the legislation. However, Gates was unable to collect sufficient signatures to
qualify for the ballot, and the campaign for referendum was dropped. Ultimately, the
Labour-Progressive coalition, with the support of the Green Party, passed the Supreme
Court Act on October 14, 2003, in a vote of 63 for and 53 against.9
When referendum campaigns against both the Prostitution Reform Act and the
Supreme Court Act proved unsuccessful, opposition parties crafted policies to check the
power of Parliament and mitigate the effects of future close votes. Both United Future and
New Zealand First made the expansion of direct democracy an integral part of their
platforms heading into the 2005 election. United First promised that, should they be

9

Four members were absent and did not vote.
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elected, any parliamentary vote that passed with less than a 60 percent majority would
automatically trigger a referendum. Any referendum that passed with at least a 60 percent
majority and at least 60 percent voter turnout would be binding; otherwise, the results
would be indicative, and the government would be required to conduct an official inquiry
into the issue. United Future also proposed lowering the threshold for qualifying an
initiative from 10 to 5 percent of registered voters; any referendum that passed but didn’t
meet the 10 percent threshold would be indicative rather than binding, and Parliament
would be required to conduct an inquiry. United Future also promised that, if elected, it
would hold another binding referendum on the MMP electoral system (United Future
2005a). In its platform, New Zealand First promised that all successful citizens’ initiatives
would be binding, and could only be vetoed by a 75 percent majority House vote within a
month of passage (New Zealand First 2005). Voters were not persuaded; both United
Future and New Zealand First lost seats in the 2005 election, though both parties supported
the Labour-Progressive coalition through confidence-and-supply agreements in the 48th
Parliament.
Data and Method
Data for this project is drawn from three sources: 1) Hansard verbatim transcripts
of parliamentary debates, speeches, and questions pertaining to the Prostitution Reform
Act and the Supreme Court Act; 2) all newspaper articles about both pieces of legislation
published in the New Zealand Herald, the country’s highest circulating major daily (N=
213), from the introduction of legislation in the House to the end of the referendum
campaigns; 3) press releases referring to each law from the time the bill was introduced in
the House to the time the repeal campaign were abandoned (N=59). My goal in data
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collection was not to craft a representative sample of all public discourse about sex work
or judicial reform; rather, I use newspaper articles and press releases to capture the
perspectives of the political elites and special interest groups on both sides of the
referendum issue10. I focus on the construction and promotion of democracy frames, not
their reception, and make no claims as to the dominance or prevalence of these frames as
compared to others. Although my case studies vary in terms of the type of vote and the
timing of opposition efforts, my objective is not to directly compare discourses about the
two laws. Instead, I use these case studies together to illustrate a pattern of invoking the
closeness of the vote to justify repeal efforts on democratic grounds.
Using the software program NVivo 11, I analyzed the data following the flexible
coding approach proposed by Deterding and Waters (2018). Although this approach was
developed primarily for interview transcripts, it is also well-suited to qualitative content
analysis. Unlike traditional qualitative coding techniques derived from grounded theory,
flexible coding proposes a two-stage process in which researchers first become familiar
with their data by applying broad codes reflecting the concepts motivating the study. These
broad codes serve as a type of index, allowing the researcher to more easily apply focused
codes to subsections of the data. In the initial stage of data analysis, I applied the code
‘Close’ to all passages that mentioned the vote margin, narrowness, or contentiousness of
the legislation. After indexing the data in this way, I used an inductive approach to identify
more specific themes. The broad theme of democracy emerged from the data at this stage,

10

In the case of the Supreme Court Act, the Herald editorial board itself was an important opponent of the
legislation, and played an active role in the referendum campaign.
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as did two specific subthemes: 1) public consultation and popular support, and 2) politics
and ideology.

Findings
Opponents of both the Prostitution Reform Act and the Supreme Court Act invoked
closeness as evidence of uncertainty or precarity to justify amending or repealing the law.
For instance, in an update on progress toward collecting signatures to qualify a referendum
on the Prostitution Reform Act, MPs Larry Baldock and Gordon Copeland argued, “People
will recall that the [Act] became the law of the land […] on a vote of 60 for, 59 against,
and one abstention – the closest possible result! We believe that all New Zealanders should,
in the light of that effective dead heat, be given an opportunity to have their say” (United
Future 2004). Here, the MPs refer to the closeness of the vote to imply that the outcome
was unclear; the phrase “effective dead heat” suggests that the vote was essentially tied,
with citizens called upon to break the tie and clarify the result through referendum.
Although the Prostitution Reform Act passed by a narrower margin than the Supreme Court
Act, in both cases, opponents of the legislation invoked closeness as evidence of
uncertainty or precarity to justify amending or repealing the law. Furthermore, these
justifications were based on a discourse in which close votes were portrayed as
fundamentally undemocratic.
Opponents of both Acts frequently described the legislation as a betrayal of
democracy (Library of Parliament 2003b). This rhetoric was used to describe both the
conscience vote that passed the Prostitution Reform Act and the whipped vote that passed
the Supreme Court Act (New Zealand First 2003b, 2005). This suggests that the specific
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parliamentary procedures through which legislative decisions were taken were not enough
to form the basis of the charge that the votes were undemocratic. Rather, the prevalence of
democracy frames across vote type shows how the use of this rhetoric was a political move
to undermine the legislation. It was not the fact that the vote was free (or whipped) that
made it anti-democratic, but that it was free (or whipped) and close. In both of these cases,
the closeness of the vote was at the core of debates about the legitimacy of the outcome,
while the specific parliamentary procedures were strategically marshaled as supporting
evidence. These debates centred on two specific themes: public consultation and popular
support, and politics and ideology.
Public Consultation and Popular Support
A common argument made by opponents to the Prostitution Reform and Supreme
Court Acts was that these decisions did not reflect the will of the people. First, many argued
that the legislation was passed without public consultation. For example, in a press release
laying out the direct democracy policy, the New Zealand First Party characterized the sex
work and Supreme Court laws as political whims: “New Zealand has witnessed a period
of the most dramatic changes to our social and constitutional fabric. And all of this without
any real public consultation. […] Do you remember being asked about [legalized
prostitution and the abolition of the privy council]? Well your memory is not at fault – you
were never asked. In fact these major changes were made on the whim of MP consciences”.
The statement framed a lack of consultation as a threat to democracy: “Our democracy is
too precious to be trifled with – you must be allowed to have your say on major issues”
(New Zealand First 2005). Often, particularly in debates about the Supreme Court Act, the
speed at which the reforms took place was cited as evidence for a lack of public
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consultation. Stakeholders described the laws as being “foisted upon” citizens, and
“rammed through” Parliament (Federated Farmers 2003). For instance, in a critical
editorial, the New Zealand Herald characterized privy council reform as a “legal
steamroller”, and claimed that the government coalition “intends to pass the Supreme Court
Bill quickly […]. It will not slow passage of the bill […] despite opposition from Maori
and business interests, and the concern of at least one of its MPs” (Tunnah and Berry 2003).
In a response published in the Herald the next day, Prime Minister Helen Clark
took issue with the paper’s implication that the Supreme Court legislation was taking place
hastily and without public consultation, arguing that “there has been nothing rushed about
moves to provide for New Zealand’s final court of appeal to be located in this country. On
the contrary, it has been a long and considered process, with ample opportunity for all
interested parties to have their say”. She rejected the editorial board’s depiction of the
process as dictatorial, describing it instead as a “democratic decision-making process
pursued openly and in good faith with the electorate” (Clark 2003). In her editorial, the
Prime Minister lays out in detail the scope and duration of public consultations, noting that
the issue of abolishing the right of appeal to the Privy Council had been on the political
agenda for 20 years, and that the Labour government had “revived public debate” on the
issue in 1999 (Clark 2003). The editorial includes a lengthy summary of the legislative
process, in which the Prime Minister repeatedly foregrounds public consultation and
support at every stage:
The government underwent a major consultative exercise in 2001 and last year to canvas
opinion on changes to the court’s structure. We met extensively with Maori in 2001 to
discuss proposals, and a ministerial advisory group was set up to examine the issues.
Labour’s policy to bring the top level of appeal in the court system back to New Zealand
was in our election manifesto last year, so that voters could take it into account. When the
[bill] was introduced to Parliament last December, it was the culmination of two years of
formal consultation and development, which included receiving 70 submissions from the
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public. In June this year, the Government again consulted Maori about the courts’ structure
at a national hui at Taupo. Once the [bill] came before the House, nearly 300 individuals
made submissions to the parliamentary select committee considering it. Nine months after
its introduction, the bill was reported back to Parliament, where it has clear majority
support. (Clark 2003, emphasis added)

In this passage, the Prime Minister repeatedly highlights the nature, scope, and duration of
public consultations, before concluding with a claim of the bill’s strong support in
Parliament. This framing portrays parliamentary support as a direct reflection and
consequence of public consultation and approval. Unlike opponents who characterize the
quick passage and close vote as evidence of a lack of public deliberation and support, the
Prime Minister refers to a “clear majority” despite the three-vote margin. The implication
is that, based on extensive consultation, there is clear support for the bill, which is reflected
in its majority support in Parliament. Furthermore, by deliberately invoking national
sovereignty in describing the legislation’s intent (bringing “the top level of appeal […]
back to New Zealand”), Prime Minister Clark alludes to themes of representation and
participation to imply that the national court itself would actually be more democratic than
the current alternative.
Second, opponents of the Prostitution Reform and Supreme Court Acts claimed that
the government’s decisions did not reflect public opinion, which they claimed was firmly
against both laws. A common strategy was to cite statistics on public opinion drawn from
public submissions to Parliament or to local councils, or from polls. For instance, in the
case of the Prostitution Reform Act, opponents focused on consultations that took place in
the course of the development of brothel bylaws and suggested they were evidence of
broader social opposition. Stakeholders noted the volume of submissions to Auckland and
Christchurch City Councils, and the proportion of those submissions that were in favour of
tighter regulations on the sex industry than would be allowed under the PRA. For example,
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a newspaper article about the development of Auckland’s brothel bylaw reported that 50
percent of the 974 public submissions to council supported the strictest possible controls
on the sex industry, including a complete ban on soliciting in residential areas (Orsman
2003b).
In the case of the Supreme Court Act, where opposition focused on amending the
law before it passed, opponents highlighted the nature and volume of submissions to the
parliamentary select committee. For example, in a press release, the lobby group Campaign
for the Privy Council argued:
The major users of the Privy Council are all strongly opposed to the new Supreme Court.
The public is not noticeably in favour of a new court, and there are far more people actively
opposed to the Bill than publicly supporting it. […] The [Justice and Electoral Select
Committee] received 312 written submissions on the Supreme Court Bill this year. These
were split 60/40 in favour of appeals to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
continuing. Oral submissions were 75% in favour of retaining appeals. (Campaign for the
Privy Council 2003b)

This passage shows how the Campaign introduces the theme of public support (“the public
is not noticeably in favour…”, “there are more people actively opposed than publicly
supporting...”) while presenting statistics referring to submissions made by special interest
groups (“the major uses of the Privy Council”). The Campaign deliberately portrays the
legislation as widely unpopular (and thus undemocratic) rather than opposed only by
special interests.
Stakeholders both for and against the Supreme Court Act strategically used polling
data to support their positions. In particular, opponents of the bill cited a poll conducted by
the New Zealand Herald that found a lack of popular support for the legislation, as well as
high levels of support for a referendum. In an editorial, the editorial board of the Herald
used the polling data to challenge the legitimacy of the government’s actions: “A new
Herald poll […] finds that support has shrunk to 36.1 percent – and 47.9 percent now want
65

the Privy Council retained. If the Government can still muster a wafer-thin majority in
Parliament to pass the Supreme Court Bill, it can no longer claim anything approaching a
popular mandate” (Anon 2003a). Here, the editorial contrasts the “wafer-thin majority in
Parliament” with a “popular mandate”; it implies that support for the legislation reflects
effortful political manoeuvring (“can still muster…”) rather than the general will. Later in
the editorial, the board goes a step further, claiming that the coalition government lacks a
mandate even within Parliament. The closeness of the vote is fundamental to these claims;
not only does the vote margin not reflect the popular will (because, if it did, we would not
see such a mismatch between the margin and the polling figures), but the fact that the
government was unable to secure broad support in the House suggests a lack of authority
to pass the law. In response, Prime Minister Clark challenged the validity of the poll,
claiming that design issues limited its accuracy. She accused the Herald of deliberately
fielding a methodologically flawed “attack poll” in order to score political points (Tunnah
2003a).
In the absence of polling data, opponents marshalled other kinds of evidence in
support of their claims, including the actions of local governments and the number of
signatures on referendum petitions. For example, several months after the Prostitution
Reform Act was passed, and as city councils were drafting new brothel bylaws, MP Gordon
Copeland posed the following question to Acting Minister of Justice Lianne Dalziel during
Question Period in the House of Representatives: “Does the Minister now agree that the
decriminalization of prostitution was not supported by the people of New Zealand, when
we see the local authorities who represent those people bringing in restrictions on brothel-
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keeping in their areas, thus reflecting the true sentiments of their citizens?” (Library of
Parliament 2003a). Acting Minister Dalziel flatly rejected Copeland’s interpretation.
Opponents of the PRA also strategically used the number of signatures collected on
the referendum petition to imply that the legislation was unpopular. In a press release, a
spokesperson for Stop the Abuse, an anti-trafficking organization, pointed out: “140,000
people have already signed the petition indicating that the public want a say on this
controversial law. New Zealanders want a chance to be heard on this issue because it was
the most contentious conscience issue in several year and was passed by just one vote”
(Stop the Abuse 2004). In referring to the vote margin, the organization draws a sharp
contrast between the one deciding parliamentary vote and the 140,000 people opposed to
the law. By January 2005, the campaign to collect the signatures of 10 percent of registered
voters had failed, but opponents still invoked the number of signatures as evidence of a
lack of popular support for decriminalization. Sponsoring MPs Larry Baldock and Gordon
Copeland said, “Although we have come up short […], clearly thousands of New
Zealanders believe that Parliament got it wrong in 2003 and calls for repeal will continue”
(United Future 2005b).
A final argument made by opponents of the Supreme Court Act held that the
Government’s refusal to amend the law to authorize a referendum was evidence of a lack
of popular support. This argument was not made with regard to the Prostitution Reform
Act, because that referendum campaign sought to repeal the law after it was passed. In the
case of the Supreme Court Act, however, many stakeholders claimed that the government
had no mandate to pursue such sweeping reforms without a referendum. While the
Government argued that changes to court structure were procedural matters that could be
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decided by simple majority in the House of Representatives, opponents characterized the
measure as a significant constitutional change that should be subject to popular referendum,
as recommended by the Royal Commission on the Electoral System. Alasdair Thompson,
chief executive of the Employers and Manufacturers Association, argued in a press release:
“The Supreme Court Bill represents major constitutional change which is being undertaken
without full public participation […] We believe the [bill] should only proceed if 75 percent
of the votes in Parliament support it, or if 51 percent of all eligible voters support it in a
referendum” (Employers and Manufacturers Association 2003). Here, Thompson implies
that closes legislative votes are illegitimate, but close direct democratic votes are not. Not
all stakeholders agreed with Thompson; in its party platform, United Future stipulated that
only referenda that passed with 60 percent support would be binding (United Future
2005a).
Many special interest groups opposed to the Supreme Court Act accused the
government of strategically rejecting the amendment calling for a mandatory referendum
because it was afraid it would lose. New Zealand First MP Pita Paraone invoked the
Prostitution Reform Act in accusing the government of attempting to force judicial reform
in the absence of popular support:
Given the narrow margin by which this bill was scraped through [at second reading], should
not a halt be called until such time as adequate debate and consultation have been
undertaken? The lack of support surely indicates that this issue needs further policy
analysis – or is the Government afraid of what the New Zealand First, ACT, and National
petition […] likely to produce? This Government passed the Prostitution Reform Act by
one vote. A similar situation is about to happen here. (Library of Parliament 2003b)

Here, Paraone associates the close vote at second reading with precarity and uncertainty by
suggesting that the issue “surely” requires further consideration. He foregrounds the
Government as subject, both implicitly (“the bill was scraped through…”) and explicitly
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(“this Government passed…”) to imply calculation and strategy. Paraone invokes the
Prostitution Reform Act as a cautionary tale – a case of sweeping legislation that was
passed by a government intent on pushing an agenda with no popular mandate.
Politics and Ideology
Arguments about the Government’s deliberate refusal to amend the Supreme Court
Bill to allow for greater public involvement are closely related to a second theme invoked
by opponents of the legislation: that of political manoeuvring and ideology. Both the
Prostitution Reform Act and the Supreme Court Act were characterized by opposition
parties, and especially those on the far right, as evidence of Labour’s ideological agenda
being foisted on the people. For example, in a speech against the Crimes Amendment Bill
in March of 2004, United Future MP Marc Alexander brought up the Prostitution Reform
Act, calling it “ideological rubbish that this Government is trying to shove down the throats
of New Zealanders” (Library of Parliament 2004). In a press release supporting the direct
democracy policy, New Zealand First MP Winston Peters accused the Prime Minister of
“consulting the mirror on her bathroom wall” rather than seeking popular support for
Government policies. Peters argued, “the idea of giving the people a say on major issues
fills the Prime Minister and her political coven11 with dismay because they know most
people oppose Labour’s agenda to transform New Zealand into a politically correct, gender
bent, lawless, Third World republic” (New Zealand First 2003a). Both the PRA and the
SCA were cited as prominent examples of the “Labour agenda”. Referring to the Supreme
Court Act, the Maxim Group, a prominent Christian think tank, argued:

11

The criticism of Prime Minister Clark and other female members of Cabinet was deeply misogynistic,
particularly from right-wing parties. The reference to the evil queen from Snow White (“consulting the
mirror...”) and the allusion to witchcraft (“her political coven...”) are just two examples of this dynamic.
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Proceeding to severe [sic] this important link [to the Privy Council] with just 52% support
of Parliament amounts to tyranny by a slim majority. It is an abuse of power that shows
how easily our liberty can be threatened. […] The Labour administration supported by the
Greens has no public mandate for this move. Instead it is fulfillment of an ideological
agenda. (Maxim Institute 2003)

These examples illustrate how opponents characterized the close votes on sex work and
judicial reform as part of an ideology or agenda, even going so far as to link them with
tyranny and a threat to liberty. These framings are in contrast to the idea of mandate that
was frequently invoked in discussions of popular support for the proposed legislation.
Essentially, tyrants rule by whim or fiat and are accountable only to themselves; democratic
leaders rule in accordance with a mandate granted to them by the people.
Critics portrayed both the conscience vote on the Prostitution Reform Act and the
whipped party vote on the Supreme Court Act as underhanded political moves. For
example, in laying out the party platform, New Zealand First Party Leader Winston Peters
argued that, “‘people power’, by means of referenda, should, where possible and
practicable, replace MPs conscience votes. The process needs to be fair, practical,
transparent, and transcend party politics” (New Zealand First 2005). Here, in juxtaposing
the two sentences, Peters implied that conscience votes are unfair, impractical, opaque, and
partisan. In the same statement, Peters further characterized conscience votes as
superseding the will of the people and “trifling with democracy” (New Zealand First 2005).
In another example, when MP Pita Paraone warned in a speech that the Supreme
Court Act would pass under the same narrow circumstances as the Prostitution Reform
Act, he was heckled by another Member, who objected to the false equivalence (“Stop
telling porkies!”). In response, Paraone continued his criticism of the PRA by sarcastically
describing Choudhury’s abstention: “Well, whatever the difference was, it was very close,
even if we did have one Member from the Government side of the House give new meaning
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to objection by abstaining. What does that tell us about this Government? It tells us that it
has its own agenda” (Library of Parliament 2003b). The implication seems to be that
Choudhury was too cowardly to object to the Government agenda by casting a no vote,
even though the conscience vote was ostensibly free. Unlike other members of his party
who strategically portrayed conscience votes as inherently undemocratic, Paraone’s
criticism is that, in the case of the PRA, the Government’s agenda effectively prevented
one from truly taking place. A similar charge was made by United Future MP Marc
Alexander, who brought up the Prostitution Reform Act in a speech against criminal justice
reform in early 2004. Alexander described the Government as “putting through” the
Prostitution Reform Act; Labour MP David Cunliffe interjected to remind Alexander that
the PRA “was a member’s bill!”. Alexander dismissed Cunliffe’s heckle: “But we all know
that the Government squeezed the arm of every Labour member to vote in favour of it. It
passed, after great consideration, by one abstention” (Library of Parliament 2004). Here,
Cunliffe points out that, as a member’s bill, the PRA is not officially part of the
Government’s policy agenda; Alexander’s response suggests that the Labour Government
used the private member’s bill – which was introduced by a Labour MP – to further its own
aims, and improperly pressured its legislators to support the party line despite public
assurances of a free vote. In these exchanges, opponents of the Prostitution Reform Act use
the narrow vote margin and Choudhury’s abstention strategically to suggest underhanded
dealings by the Labour Party.
Even as opponents criticized the conscience vote that passed the Prostitution
Reform Act, they simultaneously objected to the Supreme Court Act on the grounds that
the whipped vote was undemocratic. In particular, the inability of the Government to secure
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the support of opposition parties was cited as evidence that the legislation was not
representative of a broad mandate. New Zealand First derided the Supreme Court Bill as
“a backroom deal done with two minor parties” (New Zealand First 2003b). Furthermore,
in a press conference in Wellington, Party Leader Winston Peters implied that the whipped
vote forced many MPs, particularly those in the labour caucus, to vote against their
constituents’ interests: “Given a free vote, many in the Labour Caucus would not support
this change. And given the nature of their support base, neither they should. In particular
those MPs representing the Maori electorates cannot, in any conscience, vote for the
Supreme Court Bill” (New Zealand First 2003c). The (perhaps unintentional) use of the
word ‘conscience’ here is ironic, given that Peters would later claim that conscience votes
are illegitimate and suggest they be replaced by popular referenda whenever possible.
The close votes on the Prostitution Reform Act and Supreme Court Act sparked
broader questions on the legitimacy of the MMP electoral system. Mixed-member
proportional voting systems are designed to promote coalitions; however, because New
Zealand does not require a supermajority to pass legislation, small parties often play an
outsize role in lawmaking and relatively close votes are to be expected. Between 2002 and
2005, the second-term Labour government – perhaps emboldened by the crushing electoral
defeat of its political rival, the National Party – pursued sweeping social reform. The 47th
Parliament was unique in that it saw relatively contentious victories in quick succession on
a number of significant moral or constitutional issues, including sex work, judicial reform,
civil unions, and indigenous land rights. Opponents to the Prostitution Reform Act and the
Supreme Court Act claimed that Labour was acting in bad faith by taking advantage of
MMP to push an ideological agenda. For example, in a meeting with supporters, New
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Zealand First Party Leader Winston Peters complained that “only seven years after the first
MMP election, New Zealanders were again suffering from an illusion of democracy, with
their two ticks on ballot papers actually setting up three years of political tyranny.” Peters
argued, “MMP has been perverted back into a form of FPP in which a Labour minority
government rules unchecked through backroom deals done with two minor parties” (New
Zealand First 2003b).
Furthermore, opponents used the distinction between list and electoral Members of
Parliament to challenge the legitimacy of the Supreme Court Act, and, by extension, MMP.
The bill was sponsored by Attorney General Margaret Wilson, a list MP, who failed to
secure an electoral victory in her riding. The Campaign for the Privy Council strongly
implied that Wilson’s appointment undermined the legitimacy of the law: “The
Government’s determination to force the Bill through Parliament displays a breath-taking
arrogance. Margaret Wilson has alleged that opposition is purely political, thereby
implying that it can be safely ignored. That is perhaps an unwise conclusion for the Labour
Party’s unelectable MP to arrive at” (Campaign for the Privy Council 2003c). New Zealand
Herald columnist Garth George agreed: “It doesn’t help that Margaret Wilson is a
politician who is so popular with the people that she scored a mere 6,783 votes out of
32,726 cast in Tauranga last year, and who owes her position in Parliament to nothing more
than being a member of the Labour Party’s academic old girls’ network” (George 2003b).
The Prostitution Reform and Supreme Court Acts were arguably an acid test for MMP:
they were the first major pieces of social and constitutional legislation to pass narrowly
under the new electoral system. For opposition parties, the PRA and the SCA raised doubts
about the desirability of MMP; the controversy surrounding the passage of these laws

73

created fertile conditions for elites to question the legitimacy of the entire electoral system.
United Future made a new referendum on MMP part of its 2005 platform, and New Zealand
First proposed an extensive direct democracy policy to check the power of Parliament,
though both were rejected by voters.

Conclusion
Efforts to transform society through legal means often result in backlash, though
such opposition is not always successful in overturning or circumventing legislation. In
this paper, I explored elite opposition to two narrowly-passed laws in New Zealand’s 47th
Parliament: the Prostitution Reform Act, which passed by one vote in June of 2003, and
the Supreme Court Act, which passed by three votes in December of the same year. From
an analysis of parliamentary transcripts, newspaper articles, and press releases, I found that
the vote margin played a major role in shaping opposition messaging. Elites, and especially
political leaders from the United Future and New Zealand First parties, strategically used
the closeness of the vote to frame the legislation as fundamentally undemocratic. In
particular, opponents highlighted two major themes: public consultation and popular
support, and politics and ideology.
Reactions to the Prostitution Reform and Supreme Court Acts extend the backlash
literature in a number of ways. Unlike the majority of extant empirical work, these laws
are legislative rather than judicial, and opposition efforts ultimately failed, both in terms of
direct opposition to the PRA and SCA, and in terms of broader efforts to expand direct
democracy. These cases illustrate the importance of politics in understanding backlash,
particularly to legislation. I argued for a more processual understanding of backlash, one
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that is well-suited to the analytical tools of social movement literatures, especially frames.
In legislative cases, and especially in cases that fail to reach critical mass in the broader
public, the leaders of these movements are often political actors. Thus, political dynamics
are crucial to understanding cases of failed legislative backlash, because opposition stays
relatively contained within the political sphere. In New Zealand, political spaces like the
House of Representatives and its select committees were important sites of contention.
Public rallies and events, like the Repeal Week timed to coincide with the anniversary of
the passage of the sex work law, were promoted by political parties. Even the New Zealand
Herald, the country’s most widely read newspaper, took on an explicitly partisan role, both
in the stance and activism of its editorial board, and its funding and strategic use of polling.
Furthermore, in the cases I studied, opponents drew on specific features of the
political system to craft arguments about the legitimacy of the two laws. This suggests that
the nature and scope of backlash is heavily dependent on the broader social and political
context in which these movements are embedded. The majority of the law and social
change literature focuses on the United States, but does not pay adequate attention to the
ways in which the unique sociopolitical context of the American case influences backlash
movements. In New Zealand, opposition campaigns were shaped by factors including party
and government structure, parliamentary voting procedures, the electoral system and recent
adoption of MMP, the limited scope of direct democracy, and the country’s relationship
with the Crown. Opposition groups made explicit reference to these issues in an attempt to
secure broad public support for change. Scholarship on law and social change and backlash
would benefit from a more systematic investigation of the ways in which backlash
movements are shaped by their empirical contexts.
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These cases suggest that the circumstances under which a vote passes, and
especially the vote margin, are an important and understudied contributor to backlash.
Close votes entail a sense of precarity or uncertainty; they give the impression that the
outcome could easily have been different. This creates a liminal space in which electoral
or legislative outcomes are seen as vulnerable and actors can seek to challenge or invalidate
them. In New Zealand, opponents did this by invoking the closeness of the votes to imply
that the results were non-participatory, autocratic, and ideological. To be clear, closeness
was not the only issue raised by opposition leaders, and, in the case of a wider margin,
stakeholders would have undoubtedly raised different arguments to justify their opposition
to the law. In short, the vote margin did not cause the backlash. Rather, closeness created
particular conditions under which backlash occurred; these conditions were strategically
invoked by stakeholders in order to persuade voters of the illegitimacy of the laws and
justify political actions to repeal or undermine them. For instance, opponents used
closeness to criticize parliamentary voting procedures; they railed against both whipped
and conscience votes in light of the narrow margin. The speed at which decisions were
taken also became a significant point of contention in efforts to repeal the sex work and
judicial reform laws. In this case, the closeness of the vote was an important contextual
factor that shaped the meaning of the speed of reform. It seems unlikely that claims about
legislation being “rammed through” Parliament or “foisted upon” citizens would resonate
in the same way if the legislation had passed by a wider margin. In these close votes, speed
signified underhanded political dealings; in a landslide, it could have meant consensus.
Finally, there are numerous other cases of backlash to close legislative and electoral
victories. For instance, both United Future and New Zealand First used the Civil Unions
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Act, which passed by five votes in December 2004, to further justify their direct democracy
policies. In an American example, when 51 percent of Oregon voters passed a ballot
measure legalizing physician-assisted death for terminally ill patients in 1994, the law was
immediately suspended by the courts. When, in 1997, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
overturned the injunction against assisted death in Lee v. Oregon, officially implementing
the Death with Dignity Act, opponents to the legislation attempted to use another citizens’
initiative to repeal it. Efforts to overturn the law were largely abandoned when 60 percent
of voters officially rejected the repeal initiative. How did the closeness of the vote on the
1994 Death with Dignity Act (and the lack of closeness of the 1997 vote that would have
repealed it) shape opposition efforts to undermine the law? Future research should examine
whether democracy frames are present in the backlash to other close votes, and, if so, the
specific themes or images invoked in service of these frames. Furthermore, closeness is not
the only reason an electoral or legislative outcome may be seen as unsettled or precarious.
Factors including corruption, election irregularities, or even the length of time it takes to
announce a result may all generate space for contestation. The democracy frames I
observed in New Zealand may be but two instances of the mobilization of a master frame,
‘democracy in crisis’, that could become increasingly salient as political polarization
deepens.
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Chapter 4
Not in My Backyard? Municipal Responses to the
Decriminalization of Sex Work in New Zealand
Introduction
New Zealand became the first country in the world to fully decriminalize sex work
at the national level when it narrowly passed the Prostitution Reform Act (PRA) in June
2003. This legislation, based on the principle of harm minimization, sought to guarantee
the health, safety, and rights of sex workers by eliminating their criminal status and
granting them full protection under the law. Although sex work was fully decriminalized,
the legislation delegated authority to municipalities to regulate the location and signage of
brothels. Municipal responses to the legislation were varied. Some councils initially passed
symbolic legislation completely banning brothels in their areas, despite being advised that
such bans were illegal under the new law and could not be implemented (Orsman 2003b;
Powley 2003). Most councils recognized that completely banning sex work would be
impossible under the PRA, so focused instead on drafting bylaws to restrict brothels to
certain areas, and to control signage and advertising. The most restrictive bylaws, most
notably those in Christchurch and Auckland, made no distinction between commercial and
home-based operators, and were ultimately invalidated by the High Court of New Zealand.
The hostile response of many territorial authorities to the Prostitution Reform Act
was largely unanticipated. After all, councils were already responsible for determining the
location of brothels – euphemistically referred to as massage parlours – under the Massage
Parlours Act of 1978 (Barnett 2007:1). Just a few weeks before the passage of the Act, MP
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Tim Barnett, who had sponsored the bill in the House, suggested that “local authorities
were unlikely to be overly affected by the decriminalization of prostitution. ‘For local
authorities it will be virtually business as usual’” (Watson 2003). Barnett, referring to his
constituency in Christchurch, predicted that determining the location of brothels was
unlikely to prove problematic: “There haven’t been any major planning rows in
Christchurch about brothels because they seem to be in semi-commercial areas. […]
Anyone new who wants to set up is likely to want to be where the other ones are” (Watson
2003). Christchurch City Councillor Sue Wells, who would eventually chair the local
committee responsible for drafting the city’s bylaw, echoed Barnett’s prediction of
business as usual: “We do land use, not social engineering” (qtd. in Watson 2003). In fact,
Christchurch City Council would embark on what critics called a "moral crusade" against
sex work, ultimately spending a quarter of a million dollars to draft and defend the bylaw,
often against the advice of its own subcommittee and lawyers (Houlahan 2005a).
How can we account for the variation in local responses to the Prostitution Reform
Act? Specifically, why did Christchurch pass such a restrictive bylaw, and go to such
lengths to defend it in court? Drawing on a qualitative comparison of Christchurch and
Wellington, the only major city not to draft or amend a bylaw after decriminalization, I
suggest that the outcome in Christchurch reflects the interaction of three factors: 1) the
relative prevalence and visibility of street-based sex work; 2) the obligations placed on the
city council by the Local Government Act of 2002; and 3) the pressures created by local
elections and council restructuring.
In the first section, I review literatures from urban studies, sociology, law, and
political science on the regulation of urban space, legal compliance, and local political
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activism. In the second section, I outline the provisions pertaining to bylaws in the national
law, and introduce my case studies, method, and data. In the third section, I explain the
three factors after addressing a potential alternative explanation. In the final section, I
conclude by reviewing the argument and discussing the contributions of the paper.

The Legal Regulation of Urban Space
The governance and regulation of urban space is a central sociolegal question.
Existing scholarship on brothel bylaws in New Zealand is primarily descriptive; it focuses
on comparing and contrasting different regulatory approaches (Jackson 2004). However,
since the 1960s, scholars and activists like Jane Jacobs (1961) have drawn attention to the
ways in which local bureaucratic governance structures exacerbate inequalities through
zoning and land-use. The field of Critical Urban Studies (CUS) invokes the work of leftist
urban scholars like Henri Lefebvre, David Harvey, Manuell Castells, and Peter Marcuse to
draw attention to the ways in which cities are essential to the “capitalist imperative of
profit-making and spatial enclosure (Brenner, Marcuse, and Mayer 2012:2). Scholars
working in this tradition emphasize that local legal and regulatory structures promote a
neoliberal agenda focused on “making urban centres attractive to both footloose capital and
to the footloose middle classes” ( Mitchell 1997:305; see also Brenner et al. 2012; Valverde
2012) . This requires a “purification of public space” (Collins and Blomley 2003) in which
those activities – and, necessarily, people – deemed ‘undesirable’ are “regulated out of
existence” (Laurenson and Collins 2007:649). There exists a significant empirical literature
within CUS that examines bylaws and ordinances pertaining to homelessness and sex work
(Amster 2003; DeVerteuil 2006; Hermer and Mosher 2002; Jackson 2004; Laurenson and

80

Collins 2007; Mitchell 1997; Valverde 2012). Unlike mainstream urban sociology, which
tends to “render law invisible” (Valverde 2012:8), Critical Urban Studies clearly identifies
the ways in which commodification relies on legal and regulatory structures that deepen
inequality and marginalization. However, as Valverde points out, CUS tends to “share
Marxism’s narrow view of law as a mere ‘superstructure’ that does not need to be closely
analyzed because it is a reflection of and explained by class interests” (2012:8).
Furthermore, although Critical Urban Studies shows how local regulations reflect
transnational neoliberal ideology, this scholarship largely overlooks the ways in which
municipal actions are shaped by national laws and policies.
Within the field of law and society, however, scholars have explored compliance
with and implementation of national laws (Albiston 2005; Edelman 2015; Edelman and
Talesh 2011; Fuller, Edelman, and Matusik 2000; Suchman and Edelman 1996). Law and
society scholars have focused particular attention on the ways in which organizations
interpret their obligations under American anti-discrimination and civil rights law.
Scholars like Lauren Edelman (2015) and Catherine Albiston (2005) adopt a constructivist
(Ewick and Silbey 1998; Sarat and Kearns 2009) and neoinstitutionalist (Powell and
DiMaggio 1991; Suchman and Edelman 1996) approach to suggest that organizations,
rather than being sanctioned by exogenous legal forces, actively “interpret, mediate,
construct, and ultimately shape the meaning of civil rights law” (Edelman 2005:338). For
example, while Title VII of the 1964 US Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination in
employment, “it is silent as to the question of what actions an employer might take to rebut
an employee’s claim of discrimination” (Edelman, Uggen, and Erlanger 1999:406).
Nevertheless, most organizations have instituted formal grievance procedures of some sort,
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which serve as both a symbol of non-discrimination and a means to protect employers from
legal liability. The scope and content of specific procedures may vary widely across
organizations, but, over time, actors in both organizational and legal fields “come to equate
grievance procedures with compliance” (Edelman et al. 1999:408).
An important contribution of this work on legal compliance is to highlight the ways
in which organizations, in developing policies to meet their obligations under antidiscrimination law, “ironically help to recreate the very inequalities” that these laws seek
to address (Albiston 2010:xii). On the surface, there are parallels between these dynamics
and the development of brothel bylaws in New Zealand’s cities. In delegating the
regulation of brothels to municipalities, the national decriminalization law left significant
room for interpretation. In drafting their bylaws and defending them in court, cities actively
constructed the meaning of compliance; in Christchurch and Auckland, local
interpretations of compliance increased the marginalization of sex workers and were
deemed incompatible with the national law. However, because this strand of law and
society scholarship focuses on private organizations, and especially firms, it cannot fully
account for the dynamics that influence the interpretation of legal compliance within public
organizations. For example, consultations with constituents played an important role in the
bylaw development process in Christchurch and Auckland; constituents are not employees.
For the most part, legal compliance within a private organization reflects factors internal
to organizations themselves, including corporate culture, management structures, and
employee relationships. In a public organization, external factors and political pressures
play a more salient role.
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In recent years, a growing literature in law and political science has explored
discrepancies between law and policy at the national and local levels. In the United States,
there are numerous examples of local governments acting to oppose or even circumvent
national laws. For example, in 2004, Gavin Newsom, then-Mayor of San Francisco, issued
an executive order that allowed same-sex couples to legally marry, in open defiance of
national laws prohibiting gay marriage (Riverstone-Newell 2012:402). Riverstone-Newell
identifies dozens of cases of “local activism”, local political behaviours that are “official,
positive acts of defiance that can reasonably be understood as deliberate attempts to
spotlight unfavourable laws” and, ultimately, to compel higher governments to change their
policy positions, either voluntarily or through judicial challenges (2012:402). Local
activism often – but not always – promotes liberal policy positions (Jokiaho 2020; Myrberg
2017; Riverstone-Newell 2012). For example, in 2016, the Swedish government passed
legislation that increased the state’s capacity to receive refugees, and “created a more equal
distribution of refugees across municipalities in order to better facilitate their integration”
into society (Jokiaho 2020:1). In response, the municipality of Ostersund urged the national
government not to set a maximum on the number of migrants each locality could receive,
and explored possibilities of coordinating with other cities in order to receive more refugees
than the national law allowed. In contrast, the municipality of Solvesborg challenged the
law on the grounds that the town’s right to self-government encompassed the right to refuse
migrants (Jokiaho 2020:23).
Legal scholars Jessica Bulman-Pozen and Heather Gerken (2009) have coined the
term “uncooperative federalism” to theorize local resistance to national policies; this
concept is a valuable addition to current scholarship on federalism and local government
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law. They note that this scholarship typically characterizes subnational governments in
federal systems in one of two ways. On the one hand, when states and cities are autonomous
policymakers, they become rivals and challengers to the federal system. On the other, when
subnational government are not autonomous, they serve as “supportive insiders who help
implement federal policy” – this is cooperative federalism. However, there are numerous
cases in which a “state’s status as servant, insider, and ally […] enables it to be a sometime
dissenter, rival, and challenger” (Bulman-Pozen and Gerken 2009:1258). Bulman-Pozen
and Gerken refer to these cases as uncooperative federalism. If federalism can be conceived
of as a dialogue (Shapiro 1995), with national and subnational governments engaged in
conversation about national law and policy, that dialogue may be more or less contentious.
At one end of the spectrum are “the polite conversations and collaborative discussions that
cooperative federalism champions”. The authors suggest that “uncooperative federalism
occupies the remainder of this spectrum – from restrained disagreement to fighting words”
(Bulman-Pozen and Gerken 2009:1271).
The concept of uncooperative federalism is useful in that it explains how gaps in
federal policies can enable local activism. This “interstitial dissent”, which occurs in the
gaps left open – deliberately or accidentally – by federal policymakers, can take many
forms. It may be licensed: national governments may assume “that states will deviate from
federal norms in implementing federal policy, but states take that invitation in a direction
the federal government may not anticipate” (Bulman-Pozen and Gerken 2009:1271–72).
Other instances of interstitial dissent occur “in a regulatory gap, when the federal
government does not contemplate state variation but states have sufficient discretion that
they find ways to contest federal policy” (1271–72). Although Bulman-Pozen and Gerken
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are writing explicitly about federal systems, especially the United States, I suggest that
some dynamics of uncooperative federalism, and especially the logic of interstitial dissent,
are relevant to decentralized governance structures in unitary states like New Zealand. A
late amendment to the Prostitution Reform Act empowered city councils to determine the
location and signage of brothels. However, cities already held powers to zone under the
Resource Management Act of 1991, which they used to regulate massage parlours prior to
decriminalization; Parliament did not anticipate that municipalities would draft dedicated
brothel bylaws (Barnett 2007; Government of New Zealand 2002d), or that these bylaws
would contravene the national law.
In New Zealand, this regulatory gap created by the amendment to the national sex
work law was exacerbated by unanticipated interaction effects between the Prostitution
Reform Act and other national laws, specifically the Local Government Act (2002c) and
the Local Elections Act (2001). Existing scholarship on interactions between laws has
typically focused on tensions or conflicts across jurisdictions. For example, in Europe,
national environmental regulations often come into conflict with supranational EU policies
(Eberlein and Grande 2005; Knill and Lenschow 1998). However, this literature typically
focuses on laws that pertain to the same issues; in this way, the interplay between
supranational and national laws resembles the uncooperative federalism described by
Bulman-Pozen and Gerken (2009). The case of brothel bylaws in New Zealand is unique
in that the local implementation of the national decriminalization law was shaped by
provisions of other national laws that had no substantive relationship to sex work.
In this paper, I extend these literatures through a case study of the development of
brothel bylaws in Christchurch and Wellington. I suggest that, in Christchurch, provisions
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of the Local Government Act (2002) and the Local Elections Act (2001) put pressure on
the city council to consult with constituents and respond to their demands; these
constituents were hostile to sex work because of the relative prevalence of street-based
sex work in Christchurch as compared to other cities.

Case Studies, Method, and Data
I conduct a qualitative comparative analysis of municipal responses to the
decriminalization of sex work in New Zealand. The primary case study is the Christchurch
City Brothels Bylaw of 2004, one of the harshest bylaws developed, and the first one to
face a legal challenge. Although Christchurch did periodically develop and approve new
bylaws after the 2004 Brothels Bylaw was invalidated by the High Court, I focus on the
period between June 2003 and March 2006, which encompasses the Council’s initial
consideration of its rights and obligations under the new law, as well as its decision to drop
its appeal of the verdict in Willowford Family Trust and Brown v. Christchurch City
Council. The secondary case study is the Wellington Consolidated Bylaw 2001 Part 17A:
Commercial Sex Places. Wellington was the only major city that didn’t draft of amend a
bylaw after decriminalization. I use Wellington’s pre-decriminalization bylaw as a shadow
case to highlight salient factors in the primary case study (Gerring and Cojocaru 2016).
The Prostitution Reform Act and Local Bylaws
Clauses 12 and 14 of the Prostitution Reform Act delegate authority to local councils
to manage the location and signage of brothels:
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12. Bylaws controlling signage advertising commercial sexual services
1. A territorial authority may make bylaws for its district that prohibit or regulate
signage that is in, or is visible from, a public place, and that advertises commercial
sexual services.
2. Bylaws may be made under this section only if the territorial authority is satisfied
that the bylaw is necessary to prevent the public display of signage that:
a) is likely to cause a nuisance or serious offence to ordinary members of the
public using the area;
b) is incompatible with the existing character or use of that area
3. Bylaws made under this section may prohibit or regulate signage in any terms,
including (without limitation) by imposing restrictions on the content, form, or amount
of signage on display.
14. Bylaws regulating location of brothels
Without limiting section 145 of the Local Government Act 2002, a territorial authority may
make bylaws for its district under section 146 of that Act for the purpose of regulating the
location of brothels. (Government of New Zealand 2003a:8)

These clauses left a great deal of room for cities to interpret their rights and obligations
under the law, and as a result, there was significant variation in how local councils
exercised the powers granted to them by the PRA. According to a 2007 national
government evaluation report on the decriminalization law, 43 of 73 territorial authorities
in New Zealand reported formally considering their obligations under the new law in
council. Of the 43 that considered their options, 12 chose to do nothing, and 15 chose to
use their existing District Plan, meaning that they would treat brothels just like any other
building in determining zoning. For the most part, these were territorial authorities that did
not have a significant sex industry, or where the sex industry was felt to be sufficiently
discreet so as to negate the need for additional regulation. One city, Wellington, had an
existing commercial sex premises bylaw in place, and chose not to revisit the issue. Fifteen
councils, however, chose to write a new bylaw or amend an existing one. All 15 bylaws
controlled signage, and 13 also controlled the location of brothels (Government of New
Zealand 2008:137).
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These new or amended bylaws included provisions to regulate the size, type,
location, and content of brothel signage. In addition, most of the new bylaws restricted the
location of brothels by specifying that they couldn’t be within 250 meters of a school, place
of worship, or public transportation hub; many also included provisions that prevented
commercial sex premises from operating at ground level or within 75 metres of one
another, and some banned brothels entirely from residential areas. The most significant
difference between these bylaws concerns their treatment of home-based operators. The
Prostitution Reform Act distinguishes between commercial brothels and small owneroperated brothels (SOOBs), which are brothels of no more than four people working out
of someone’s home. The more lenient local bylaws maintained that distinction, meaning
home operators would not be subjected to the same location restrictions as commercial
brothels. The harsher bylaws, on the other hand, applied to all brothels regardless of size.
Proposed bylaws in Christchurch, Auckland, and Hamilton City faced legal challenges
from brothel owners who claimed that they were too restrictive. Cities’ approach to home
operators would prove central to determining the legality of bylaws. The regulation in
Hamilton City, which maintained a distinction between commercial and home operators,
was upheld by the High Court (Conley v. Hamilton City Council, 2006). The Christchurch
and Auckland bylaws, on the other hand, were found to place undue restrictions on home
operators and contravene the spirit of the Prostitution Reform Act, and were struck down
by the Court (Willowford Family Trust and Brown v. Christchurch City Council, 2005; JB
International Ltd v. Auckland City Council, 2006).
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Christchurch
Christchurch City Council was one of the most vocal proponents for delegating
authority to city councils to regulate the location and signage of brothels (Christchurch City
Council 2003), and it began to consider its regulatory options under the PRA as early as
July of 2003. The City Council created the Prostitution Reform Subcommittee, a group of
five Councillors that would be responsible for determining the most appropriate strategy
for the regulation of sex work, conducting public consultations, and ultimately drafting the
proposed bylaw. Initially, the Prostitution Reform Act Subcommittee drafted a bylaw that
would restrict brothels to the Central Business District, but maintained a distinction
between commercial and home-based operators. In an annotated draft circulated at the end
of June 2004, the Subcommittee defines “brothel” as “any premises kept or habitually used
for the purposes of prostitution but does not include […] b) premises i) situated in a Living
Zone as defined in the District Plan; and ii) at which not more than two sex workers works;
and iii) where each of those sex workers retains control over his or her individual earnings
from prostitution carried out at the brothel” (Christchurch City Council 2004:1). In this
draft, the Subcommittee offers a stricter definition of small owner-operated brothels than
the Prostitution Reform Act itself, which defines a SOOB as employing no more than four
sex workers, but still maintains a distinction between commercial and residential sex
premises. The draft bylaw also contained a provision to exempt existing commercial
brothels from the location restrictions. In a media statement, Subcommittee Chairperson
Sue Wells explained that the draft bylaw tried to balance the practical reality of a newly
decriminalized sex industry with local concerns (Scanlon 2004a). As The Press reported,
"The subcommittee had been told there were only about 10 SOOBs operating across the
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city, Wells said. […] Evidence to the subcommittee showed smaller brothels operating in
the suburbs did not want to attract attention to themselves" (Scanlon 2004b).
However, in a controversial and much criticized decision, on July 1, 2004, the
Christchurch City Council rejected its Subcommittee’s recommendations by a vote of 14
to 9, opting instead to restrict all brothels – including home operators – to the Central
Business District. It also decided that while eight commercial brothels fell outside the
proposed area, exemptions would be granted to just three (Scanlon 2004a). A few months
later, Terry Brown, a local businessman and brothel- and strip club-owner, filed suit against
the Council in the High Court of New Zealand. As reported in The Press, “lawyers acting
for Brown argue the council overstepped its legal authority when it ring-fenced an innercity red-light zone in July. The move was ‘an unlawful ethical discrimination’ and ‘an
unreasonable or unlawful interference with the right to work’, according to court
documents” (Conway 2004). Although the claim was initially filed to contest the Council’s
zoning restrictions on commercial brothels, the bylaw was eventually invalidated because
of the ordinance’s failure to distinguish between home-operators and commercial
establishments. In the decision in Willowford Family Trust and Brown v. Christchurch City
Council, the judge explained that, although the city council did have a right to place zoning
restrictions on brothels, the effect of these restrictions on small owner-operated brothels
was essentially to prohibit sex workers from “plying their trade at all in a substantial and
important part of the city no question of any apprehended nuisance being raised”
(Willowford 2005:para 94). In effect, the Christchurch brothels bylaw was found to be in
violation of the spirit of the Prostitution Reform Act, and invalidated in its entirety (Knight
2010:145). The City Council was reluctant to accept the Court’s decision, announcing –
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against the advice of legal counsel – that it intended to appeal. It also filed a motion
petitioning for a stay of execution so that the bylaw could remain in force pending the
outcome of the appeals process. The petition was denied, and in March of 2006, following
a High Court ruling against a similar brothel bylaw in Auckland (JB International v.
Auckland City Council 2006), Christchurch City Council voted to drop the appeal.
Ultimately, the unsuccessful legal defence of the brothel bylaw cost Christchurch
ratepayers Nz$227,000 in court costs and legal fees (Scanlon 2006). The verdicts in
Willowford and JB International largely deterred other city councils from targeting SOOBs
in their bylaws.
Wellington
Wellington is the only municipality that chose to use an existing bylaw to regulate
sex work after decriminalization. The bylaw was initially developed in 2001 in response to
a proposal by a strip club and massage parlour, the Mermaid Bar, to open in Courtenay
Place, Wellington’s theatre and entertainment district. Although the Mermaid’s developers
followed all necessary steps and had secured approvals and resource consents under
Wellington’s District Plan, then-Mayor Mark Blumsky proposed an emergency bylaw
banning the sex industry in Courtenay Place. The Mayor was concerned that opening a
strip club and massage parlour in the area would quickly attract the sex industry,
undermining neighbourhood character and jeopardizing recent efforts to revitalize the
district (Rendle 2001a). Mermaid developers B&M Entertainment objected to the proposed
bylaw, stating that it was unfair and illegal for Wellington City Council to seek to impose
restrictions on an activity that was fully legal under existing legislation. As the developers’
lawyers told the Evening Post: “[Our] position, fundamentally, is that [the] activity
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complies with the law in terms of the Resource Management Act and the District Plan. We
consider it constitutionally perverse that the city council is going to pass a bylaw to negate
rights under the Resource Management Act” (Rendle 2001c). The developers declared their
intention to challenge any bylaw preventing them from opening in Courtenay Place in
court, and the Council’s lawyers warned that a bylaw was unlikely to stand up to legal
scrutiny.
Mayor Blumsky’s proposed bylaw enjoyed widespread support in the community,
though, unlike in Christchurch, public participation in the bylaw process came largely from
business owners and industry groups. Businesses shared Mayor Blumsky’s fears that the
Mermaid Bar would open the door to the establishment of other sex industry businesses in
the neighbourhood, to the detriment of Courtenay Place’s hard-won reputation as a local
entertainment hotspot. However, in May of 2001, Wellington City Council ultimately
decided to abandon the emergency bylaw. Under the Local Government Act of 1974,
before a bylaw could be passed, it must be advertised, and the public must be given 21 days
in which to comment, meaning that the Council would not be able to pass any ordinance
before the Mermaid was scheduled to open. Additionally, though the Council consulted a
second law firm, it was again cautioned that a bylaw was unlikely to withstand a court
challenge (Rendle 2001d). Although the City Council was unable to prevent the Mermaid
from opening in Courtenay Place, in July 2001 it passed a bylaw preventing any additional
commercial sex premises from opening up in the district; in September 2001 it passed
another bylaw imposing tight controls on signage and advertising for such businesses
throughout the city (Johnson 2001; Rendle 2001f).
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After the passage of the Prostitution Reform Act, Wellington City Council
discussed its rights and obligations under the new law at a meeting in September 2003. As
reported in the Dominion Post, many councillors seemed to make light of the problem of
sex work in the city:
The tone of the meeting, called to discuss possible fallout from new prostitution laws, was
set early on in the piece by Chairwoman Stephanie Cook. Her opening remarks about
fishnets, stilettos, and whipping through the agenda were like the proverbial red flag.
Councillor Christ Parkin was the first to take up her offer. The sex industry, he boomed,
was like housing - when supply outstripped demand, prices dropped. What the city needed
was less regulation and more brothels. ‘The facts are sex is a business and always has been.
I’m not at all concerned about the quantity. It seems like that’s the way to improve the
quality. And the competition would drive prices down. As far as I’m concerned the more
the better’. (Jacobson 2003)

Although some councillors were more concerned about the potential consequences of
decriminalization for Wellington and were offended by the tone set by Chairwoman Cook
and Councillor Parkin, ultimately, the Council decided that the existing brothel bylaw was
sufficient and further controls were unnecessary.
Data and Method
Data for this project include newspaper articles (N=364), official Hansard
transcripts of Parliamentary debates pertaining to the decriminalization of sex work,
national government evaluations and reports on the PRA, and Wellington City Council and
Christchurch City Council reports and meeting minutes. Newspaper data includes articles
published between 2001 and 2006 from major Christchurch daily The Press, Wellington
newspapers The Dominion, the Evening Post, and, eventually, the consolidated Dominion
Post, and the Auckland-based New Zealand Herald.
In the first phase of data collection, I gathered articles about the brothel bylaws
(N=220) from the Wellington and Christchurch dailies using the keywords [(“brothel” or
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“sex work” or “sex premises”) and “bylaw”]. Using the software program NVivo 11, I
applied a flexible coding approach to the data (Deterding and Waters 2018). This approach
advocates a two-stage process in which the researcher first becomes familiar with the data
by applying index codes derived from the concepts motivating the study. In this stage of
analysis, I applied two codes: “decision” and “motive”. “Decision” was applied to anything
describing a decision taken by the city council, national government, or High Court, which
helped me construct a timeline of the development of bylaws in both cities. I applied the
“motive” code to any passage that could be construed as explaining or justifying a decision,
whether the speaker was an elected official, a party to a court challenge, or a journalist.
Next, I carried out focused inductive coding of passages in the “motive” node in order to
identify key themes. This secondary thematic coding generated the three factors discussed
in the results section: the visibility of street-based sex work, the requirements for
consultation under the Local Government Act (2002), and the timing of local elections and
council restructuring. This led to a second phase of data collection and analysis, which
focused on gathering additional newspaper data (N=144) about local government and
electoral reform.

Findings
Why did Christchurch pass such a harsh bylaw, and go to such lengths to defend it
in court? I suggest that local government and electoral reform put pressure on Christchurch
City Council to appease constituents who were hostile to sex work; this hostility reflects
the prevalence and visibility of street-based work in the city. Before proceeding, however,
it is worth considering a parsimonious alternative explanation: that Christchurch, and, by
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extension, Christchurch City Council, is more conservative than Wellington, and the bylaw
simply reflected a stronger moral opposition to sex work.
Because most candidates for local office in New Zealand do not have a strong party
affiliation, local electoral outcomes are a poor indicator of general political leanings.
However, a comparison of the voting record of Christchurch and Wellington electorates in
the 2002 national election suggests that there was no significant difference in regional
support for conservative candidates – if anything, Wellington region elected more socially
conservative candidates. Greater Christchurch elected two candidates from the centre-left
Labour party by significant margins – including Tim Barnett, the sponsor of the national
decriminalization bill – one candidate from the fiscally conservative centrist National
party, and one candidate from the leftist Progressive party. Wellington region elected five
Labour candidates and one candidate from the United Future party, a party described as
centrist but founded on Christian values and with a socially conservative platform
(Government of New Zealand 2002a).
However, there is some evidence that Christchurch does have a unique political
culture – though whether it is best characterized as socially conservative is unclear. Local
historian Katie Pickles suggests that “underneath the apparently conservative surface of the
city there exists an ever-smouldering hotbed of radicalism” (2016:25). From 1988 to 2007,
the city was led by two progressive mayors, one of whom, Garry Moore, presided over the
brothel bylaw debates following the decriminalization of sex work.12 In 1988, Auckland
businessman Douglas Myers coined the nickname “The People’s Republic of

Although Moore was personally opposed to sex work and referred to brothels as “an abomination”, he
voted in favour of the subcommittee’s recommendation to exclude SOOBs from the proposed bylaw, and
against appealing the decision in Willowford (Houlahan 2005b).
12
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Christchurch” to reflect his perception of local government as anti-business and overly
centralized. Although Myers initially intended the nickname to be an insult, it was quickly
appropriated by residents to proudly refer to their city’s spirit of “municipal socialism”
(Pickles 2016:26). In 2007, local politics moved toward the right when Mayor Bob Parker
“took office […] championing the conservative spirit” that also characterizes Christchurch
politics, though Pickles’ analysis suggests that it was less prevalent in the early 2000s
during the development of the brothel bylaw than it is today. Conservative political
sentiment was counterbalanced by strong progressive mayors and a commitment to the
principles of municipal socialism within the City Council. While the principles of
municipal socialism are compatible with the brothel bylaw’s tight controls on commercial
sex premises, it is more difficult to square them with the harsh restrictions placed on homebased operators. While constituent hostility toward sex work may be evidence of social
conservatism, I suggest that provisions of the Local Government Act (2002) and Local
Elections Act (2001) created conditions under which local councillors felt pressure to
appease their more conservative constituents.
The Relative Prevalence and Visibility of Street-Based Sex Work
When sex work was decriminalized in 2003, Parliament also mandated that a
Prostitution Law Review Committee be established to evaluate the new law. In 2008, the
Review Committee issue its report to the House, and included a dedicated chapter on the
response of territorial authorities to the PRA. The Committee documented significant
variation in the way local councils responded to the Prostitution Reform Act, and noted:
“Where there has been a lot of TA activity, such as in […] Christchurch, it is often a
response to a wide range of social problems that do not necessarily relate to prostitution”
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(Government of New Zealand 2008:138). Specifically, the Committee’s report largely
attributes the reaction of the Christchurch City Council to the decriminalization bill to the
relative prevalence of street-based sex work in the city (2008:138). According to a study
by the Christchurch School of Medicine, in 2006, 253, or 11 percent, of all New Zealand
sex workers were street-based, and street-based sex work was exclusively concentrated in
Auckland, Wellington, and Christchurch. In Wellington, the prevalence of street-based sex
work was comparable to the national average, at 13 percent. In Christchurch, however, the
prevalence of street work was more than double the national average, at 26 percent.
Although these prevalence estimates were made more than two years after Christchurch
began work on its bylaw, the Christchurch School of Medicine study notes that “the
numbers of street based sex workers have remained stable since the enactment of the PRA,
with comparable numbers on the streets to estimates done prior to decriminalization”
(Abel, Fitzgerald, and Brunton 2007 qtd. in Government of New Zealand 2008:119).
Additionally, street workers in Christchurch tended to be younger than those in other urban
centres, which may have led residents to equate sex work with the sexual exploitation of
minors (Government of New Zealand 2008:119).
Furthermore, the report notes that street-based sex work in Wellington was
relatively unproblematic. It was well contained within small geographic areas, and local
residents rarely complained. In Christchurch, on the other hand, pressure from bars and
commercial brothels pushed street-based sex workers out of entertainment districts and into
neighbouring residential areas. Although some Christchurch residents reported moral
opposition to the presence of street-based sex workers in their neighbourhoods, the Review
Committee notes that often, homeowners were more critical of nuisance caused by
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workers, clients, and members of the public. For example, residents reported late night
conflicts between bar patrons and street-based workers, drunk and disorderly behaviour,
and offensive litter like syringes or used condoms left in the street or on private property.
However, Christchurch police suggested that the problems with litter and nuisance were
largely due to local liquor licensing laws and alcohol consumption, rather than to streetbased sex work itself (Government of New Zealand 2008:124).
Finally, Christchurch residents’ concerns about sex work were exacerbated by high
profile media reports in 2004 of a so-called child sex ring which alleged that girls as young
as twelve were involved in street prostitution (Scanlon and Claridge 2004). The reports
scandalized the community, and prompted responses from the police, the City Council, the
New Zealand Prostitutes Collective, Child, Youth, and Family New Zealand, and local
Members of Parliament. Although the Christchurch Police Department challenged the
veracity of the claims published in The Press, the report stoked the fears of community
members and strengthened their opposition to prostitution. In addition, in 2005, two
Christchurch street-based sex workers were murdered by their clients; the crimes received
extensive media coverage and were specifically mentioned in the evaluation report of the
Prostitution Law Review Committee to contextualize community opposition to sex work
in the city (Government of New Zealand 2008:122). I suggest that residents' demands for
a harsh brothel bylaw in Christchurch is better understood as a response to the relative
prevalence and visibility of street-based sex work, as well as to the association of this type
of work with criminality and exploitation, rather than an expression of an inherent moral
opposition to sex work as a whole.
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Local Governance Reform
The second crucial factor in explaining the Christchurch bylaw pertains to the
influence of the Local Government Act, a national law passed in 2002 that sought to
increase the autonomy, accountability, and transparency of territorial authorities. Local
government reform was a central campaign issue in the 2002 national election, with both
Labour and National candidates pledging to reform the existing Local Government Act of
1974. The existing law, which had been significantly amended since its passing, was over
800 pages long, and often vague, confusing, or contradictory. Local government reform
sought to address two major problems. First, the Local Government Act 1974 mandated
significant central government oversight of local councils, resulting in serious
inefficiencies, especially for major cities like Auckland. The LGA 1974 was written in
such a way that city councils were unable to make autonomous decisions unless the law
explicitly granted them the specific powers to do so, adding a layer of red tape to decisions
about matters as seemingly mundane as traffic or waste removal. For example, in 1999,
Manukau City Council “asked the High Court […] to confirm whether wastewater can be
applied to waste-management provisions in the Local Government Act, which at present
include only hard-wasted rubbish” (Kara 1999). In other words, the Court was asked to
consider such matters as whether compost put through a kitchen sink garbage disposal was
qualitatively different than compost discarded in a trash bag. The Local Government Act
2002 granted general competence power to cities, meaning that councils were free to
legislate any matter not explicitly denied by the legislation.
Second, prior to the passage of the Local Government Act 2002, local politics in
New Zealand suffered from a lack of transparency and accountability. Local government
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reforms in 1989 had amalgamated 850 local bodies into 86 territorial authorities comprised
of both regional and territorial levels of government, resulting in a “distancing of elected
members from the people they represent” (Anon 2001). The late 1990s and early 2000
witnessed a number of local government scandals. For instance, in 2000, the central
government conducted an evaluation of Rodney District Council; the Council was found
to be dysfunctional and incapable of resolving conflicts in a rational manner. The report
recommended that the Council be disbanded and replaced by an appointed commissioner
until the next election (Beston 2000). In another case, in Waipa District, a group of
ratepayers sent a 25-page briefing paper to Local Government Minister Sandra Lee
detailing discrepancies in the construction of a new conference centre. The group claimed
that the District Council was undemocratic, and had mismanaged more than Nz$2 million
in profits from endowment lands (Aronson 2000). The new Local Government Act 2002
redefined the purpose of local government as “[enabling] “local decision-making by and
on behalf of citizens in their local communities to promote their social, economic, cultural,
and environmental well-being” (LGA 2002 qtd. in James 2001). It also established
extensive requirements and procedures for public consultation and reporting. Both city
councillors and media commentators viewed the Local Government Act 2002 as
representing a “new philosophy of government”, that of consultative and participatory
democracy (James 2003).13
The passage of the Local Government Act 2002 contributed to the development of
Christchurch’s brothel bylaw in two ways. First, the LGA 2002’s emphasis on local

13

Although new consultation requirements were welcomed by local residents, they were largely criticized
by businesses who saw them as adding additional red tape to the approvals process.
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government autonomy granted legitimacy to the Council’s decision to draft a bylaw, even
one that challenged the spirit of the national decriminalization law. Second, and more
importantly, new requirements for consultation created an opportunity for constituents to
express sharply critical views, while the LGA 2002’s new philosophy of participatory
democracy implied that Christchurch City Council was to take those views seriously in
crafting new ordinances.
Christchurch consulted the public extensively on whether a bylaw was necessary,
as well as on the content of the proposed regulations. In October of 2003, the City Council
first invited public feedback on the necessity and scope of a bylaw through a questionnaire
posted on its website and in local newspapers; according to a report in The Press, in the
first ten days of the consultation period, the Council received more than 500 written
responses:
A report to the Council’s Regulatory and Consents Committee […] said a random sample
of 73 submissions showed 65 percent of people favoured restricting brothels to the central
business district. Only four percent said brothels should be anywhere. About 30 percent of
people raised specific concerns about the exposure of children to explicit advertising and
signage, especially in residential areas or near schools. Signage advertising for suburban
brothels was objected to by 71 percent. (Scanlon 2003)

The Council eventually received 1,500 written submissions from constituents, and heard
52 oral submissions to the Council in December of 2003 (Boyd 2010:20). Residents
expressed concerns about brothels being set up near schools and churches, the potential for
nuisance and criminality in their neighbourhoods, and the effect suburban brothels could
have on their property values. In Council meetings and reports, councillors often made
specific reference to their obligations under the Local Government Act 2002 when
discussing the consultations.
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In comparison, in Wellington, where the brothel bylaw was passed before local
government reform, public consultation and participation was relatively minimal. For
instance, although Wellington City Council was required by law to allow 21 days for public
submissions, it did not extensively advertise the draft bylaw. In fact, the most significant
advertising was done by a group of Courtenay Place business owners and residents, who
took out a full-page advertisement in the Evening Post rallying support ahead of a crucial
City Council meeting. The advertisement, “We Don’t Need Another Red Light District”,
even included a clip-out section readers could fill out and send to their councillors (Rendle
2001e).
Furthermore, reports in local newspapers suggest that the bylaw making process in
Wellington was characterized by a lack of transparency, with most of the debate and
decision-making happening behind closed doors. As journalist Steve Rendle reported, the
City Council voted to exclude the public from deliberations, with Councillor Bryan
Pepperell, usually a champion for open government, arguing that the move was necessary
to “prevent posturing” and allow councillors to “deal with a serious and sensitive matter
with much of the political heat and hype taken out of it”. Councillor Andy Foster said, “It’s
not about the Council trying to hide, it’s about us doing our job" (Rendle 2001b). The
Council even voted to exclude the public from the portion of the meeting where they were
to explain the rationale for excluding the public from the main proceedings. Stakeholders
in the potential bylaw were critical of the decisions, Rendle reports. “Keith Jefferies,
counsel for the Mermaid’s operators, left the meeting shaking his head. ‘We either live in
a democracy or we don’t’, he said. ‘There is no practical reason to exclude the public and
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all that does is suggest the council is not confident that they are going to be acting within
the law’” (Rendle 2001b).
I suggest that in Christchurch, the Local Government Act 2002 empowered the City
Council to challenge the central government’s national policy agenda by taking an active
role in the regulation of brothels, while simultaneously restricting its ability to enact
policies that ran counter to the views of constituents. My data cannot speak definitively to
the intent of Christchurch City Council in interpreting their obligations under the Local
Government Act. One possibility is that councillors were inherently hostile to
decriminalization and used the Local Government Act to justify their implicit bias against
sex workers. On the other hand, Council may have wanted to create a bylaw that was
compatible with the letter and spirit of the Prostitution Reform Act, but found their hands
tied by the need to consult and report to citizens. Regardless of the council’s motivation,
my data strongly suggests that local government reform played a key role in explaining the
outcome in Christchurch.
Local Elections and Council Restructuring
Finally, local elections and City Council restructuring played an important role in
the development of the Christchurch brothel bylaw. New Zealand has a fixed local election
cycle, with elections occurring every three years. 2001 and 2004 were both election years,
so the pressure of re-election was a factor for councillors in both Wellington and
Christchurch. However, the 2004 local election coincided with council restructuring in
Christchurch, in which the number of city councillors would be reduced by half.
Restructuring was the outcome of a process of electoral review mandated by the passage
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of the Local Elections Act of 2001 – legislation that, with the Local Government Act of
2002, was central to the national government’s commitment to local governance reform.
The Local Government Act stipulated that territorial authorities would be responsible for
initiating electoral review in order to determine the size, and method of election, and scope
of responsibilities of local bodies in either 2003 or 2006, and then regularly every six years
(Government of New Zealand 2002c:Part 1A Section 19H). The Act also strengthened the
mandate of the Local Government Commission, giving the organization the power to
conduct electoral review and make sweeping recommendations for council restructuring
(Local Government Commission 2021). Christchurch City Council launched its electoral
review in 2003; both City Manager Lesley McTurk and the Local Government
Commission described Christchurch as significantly over-governed (Warren 2003). Prior
to restructuring, Christchurch City Council was the largest territorial authority in New
Zealand, with 25 councillors (including the Mayor) – five more than Auckland, a city of
nearly 60,000 more people. Council restructuring was significant, reducing the number of
wards from 12 to eight and the number of city councillors from 25 to 13 (Warren 2003).
I suggest that, in Christchurch, the brothel bylaw was seen as an election issue14,
and the added job insecurity associated with the council restructuring put presssure on
council members to respond to citizen concerns by drafting a harsh bylaw. This dynamic
seems particularly relevant to the Council’s decision to reject the proposal by the
Prostitution Reform Act Subcommittee to exclude home operators from the bylaw, and to
ignore legal advice in order to pursue a costly appeal of the ruling in Willowford. In an

14

Councillor Sue Wells explicitly told The Press that the bylaw was not a big election issue for candidates,
which suggests that it almost certainly was (Anon 2004a).
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editorial in The Press, columnist Peter Luke attributes the Council’s decisions to political
opportunism, writing:
That a majority of councillors rejected the sub-committee’s recommendation may have had
something to do with the fact that the 2004 local body election was imminent. For the
record, of the current crop of councillors [who had won re-election after the restructuring],
eight were part of the majority that tossed out the sub- committee’s recommendation on
SOOBs. (Luke 2005).

Luke goes on to point out that all of the same councillors later voted to appeal the ruling
on the brothel bylaw.

Conclusion
The issue of municipal powers was central to the passage of the Prostitution Reform
Act in 2003. Though intended as largely symbolic, the amendment empowering councils
to determine the location and signage of brothels signalled the government’s willingness
to compromise and reassured those whose support was wavering in the run-up to the final
vote. After the passage of the PRA, however, cities differed widely in their interpretations
of their rights and obligations under the national decriminalization law. Some, largely
unaffected by sex work, didn’t even consider drafting new ordinances. Others, like
Wellington, considered the issue but deemed existing municipal bylaws sufficient to
regulate the industry. Still others, chief among them Auckland and Christchurch, drafted
harsh bylaws, which faced legal challenges and were eventually struck down by the High
Court on the grounds that they were incompatible with the national decriminalization law.
In this paper, I asked: What explains the variation in local responses to the
Prostitution Reform Act? Specifically, why did Christchurch pass such a restrictive bylaw,
and go to such lengths to defend it in court? Drawing on a comparative analysis of
Christchurch and Wellington, I suggested, first, that the relative prevalence of street-based
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sex work in Christchurch fostered hostility among residents. Second, the emphasis on
accountability and participation in the Local Government Act (2002) created new
requirements for the city council to engage with the public and to promote legislation that
reflected their concerns. Finally, local elections and impending council restructuring
increased the pressure on city councillors to respond to constituent demands. In
Christchurch, the city’s obligation to promote the national government’s policy agenda on
decriminalization was in competition with its perceived responsibility to constituents.
This study makes methodological and theoretical contributions to literatures on the
regulation of urban spaces and local responses to national law. Methodologically, while
other studies of brothel bylaws do occasionally use a comparative approach, the use of a
shadow case is novel, as is the comparison of bylaws from before and after
decriminalization. My research design essentially uses Wellington as a counterfactual to
highlight salient factors in Christchurch, particularly those related to local government and
electoral reform. In the absence of the Local Government Act, Wellington was able to pass
its bylaw with minimal consultation, and without the pressures imposed by council
restructuring. Without this counterfactual, it would be easy to overlook the salience of local
governance and electoral reform to the development of the brothel bylaw in Christchurch,
as these factors are not directly related to sex work itself.
Theoretically, this chapter showed how local ordinances that seek to purify public
space are not a simple function of social conservatism or neoliberal ideology. Rather, the
development and legal defense of Christchurch’s harsh and ultimately illegal bylaw reflects
the complex and often unanticipated interaction of local conditions and national law,
including those unrelated to sex work itself. The influence of the Local Government Act
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and Local Elections Act on the administration of the national sex work law was largely
unanticipated; these laws constrained some pathways for local action while opening others.
Future research should explore the ways in which Christchurch’s failed bylaw-making
process shaped sex work policy in the years that followed. After its legal defeat in
Willowford, Christchurch City Council did not abandon the idea of a sex work bylaw.
Council went back to the drawing board, eventually drafting a compliant bylaw that came
into force in 2013, and was reviewed in 2018. Today, the location and signage of brothels
in Christchurch is subject to the Brothels (Location and Commercial Sexual Services)
Bylaw 2018. Small owner-operated brothels are notably exempt from this ordinance. While
local culture may not have been a significant determining factor in the development of the
2004 bylaw, the city’s actions in Willowford almost certainly contributed to the perception
of Christchurch as a city hostile to sex work. The legacy of the development and legal battle
over the initial ordinance is a promising avenue for future research.
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Chapter 5
The Unanticipated Consequences of Close Votes: Liminality and
States of Exception

Introduction
A close vote is a prism that illuminates the relationship between law and social
change. In this dissertation, I explored the social and political consequences of the narrow
decriminalization of sex work in New Zealand. In a series of three stand-alone articles, I
focused on the short-term impacts of the passage of the Prostitution Reform Act in June of
2003 on media representations of sex work, national repeal initiatives, and local bylawmaking processes. Chapters were organized temporally, from shortest to longest period of
study; in each case, the closeness of the vote came into play in important and sometimes
surprising ways, whether methodologically or theoretically. In this concluding chapter, I
briefly summarize and extend the arguments of the empirical chapters and discuss the
contributions of the work.

Chapter Summaries
In Chapter 2, I focused on how the decriminalization of sex work influences media
representations of sex work. Because regulatory regimes governing sex work reflect and
shape normative beliefs about the acceptability of sex workers, full decriminalization is
essential to the eventual elimination of sex work stigma. Furthermore, under
decriminalization, media portrayals of sex work play an important role in shaping public
opinion; media outlets inadvertently step into the role previously played by the criminal
108

justice system in defining the terms of acceptable sex work. Sex work scholars have
assumed that it will take many years for public opinion and social norms to catch up to the
law in decriminalized environments, and persistent stigma against sex workers remains in
New Zealand nearly twenty years after the passage of the Prostitution Reform Act.
However, recent survey experiments on the case of same sex marriage in the United States
suggest that perceived norms are significantly and immediately responsive to a change in
law. In this chapter, I leveraged the closeness of the decriminalization vote to investigate
whether media representations might be similarly responsive.
Drawing inspiration from quasi-experimental research design, I compared
portrayals of sex workers in New Zealand’s three largest newspapers in the six months
before and six months after the passage of the Prostitution Reform Act. Through this
design, I problematized the assumption of cultural lag by taking a brief snapshot of
representations before and after a narrow legal victory. Using Link and Phelan’s influential
definition of stigma as a conceptual frame, I focused on documenting instances of labelling,
stereotyping, separation, and discrimination in a sample of 355 newspaper articles. I found
that decriminalization was associated with a decrease in labelling and certain forms of
stereotyping, but no change in separation. Furthermore, while the passage of the national
decriminalization law prohibited overt discrimination in housing or employment, it also
indirectly enabled discrimination at the local level through restrictive zoning.
In Chapter 3, I explored backlash to the Prostitution Reform Act, which culminated
in an unsuccessful attempt to repeal it through a citizens’ referendum in 2004. The
closeness of the vote on the decriminalization law not only influenced opposition efforts to
repeal it, but also shaped perceptions of the legitimacy of other laws passed around the
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same time, especially the Supreme Court Act (2003) and Civil Unions Act (2004).
Ultimately, the relatively narrow passage of these laws spurred two opposition parties to
include provisions for the expansion of direct democracy in their platforms for the 2005
general election.
I analyzed the backlash to the Prostitution Reform Act and Supreme Court Act in
order to illustrate how closeness informed opposition messaging. On the basis of an
analysis of parliamentary transcripts, press releases, and newspaper coverage of both laws
and their referendum campaigns, I found that the narrow vote margin enabled backlash by
creating a liminal space in which opponents could challenge the legitimacy of the vote.
Specifically, opposition discourse focused on portraying the passage of the Prostitution
Reform and Supreme Court Acts as fundamentally undemocratic. I described this discourse
as a democracy frame, which emphasized two major themes: public participation and
support, and politics and ideology. Throughout, opponents drew on specific features of
New Zealand’s political system to craft arguments about the legitimacy of the two laws. In
particular, party and government structure, parliamentary voting procedures, recent
adoption of the Mixed Member Proportional voting system, and the country’s status as a
former British colony played an important role in shaping opposition discourse. Though
efforts to repeal the sex work and Supreme Court laws ultimately proved unsuccessful, I
used these cases to show how the circumstances under which a vote passes, and especially
the vote margin, are important contributors to backlash. The backlash to these laws shows
how the contingency of a close vote creates new opportunities for political action.
In Chapter 4, I returned to the municipal bylaws introduced in Chapter 2. The
decision to amend the Prostitution Reform Act to empower municipalities to regulate the
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location and signage of brothels was largely a function of the anticipated close vote. This
amendment bolstered flagging support for the bill in the run up to the final vote. The
concession was largely symbolic; cities already held the power to zone under the Resource
Management Act (1991) and their respective District Plans. Following the passage of the
Prostitution Reform Act, municipalities varied widely in their responses to
decriminalization. Thirteen cities drafted new bylaws to control the location of brothels;
New Zealand’s capital, Wellington, chose to use an existing bylaw rather than draft a new
one. Bylaws in Auckland and Christchurch faced legal challenges and were eventually
struck down by the High Court of New Zealand on the grounds that they contravened the
national sex work law.
In this chapter, I explored this variation in local responses to the Prostitution
Reform Act. I focused primarily on the bylaw in Christchurch, which was not only one of
the most restrictive, but also faced a protracted legal battle. I argued that, while
Christchurch may have a conservative political culture relative to other cities, this does not
fully account for the severity of the bylaw, or the Council’s determination to fight a losing
legal battle against the advice of its lawyers. I used an innovative shadow case research
design to suggest that the bylaw was largely a product of the interaction between local
conditions and national laws, including those unrelated to sex work. By comparing
Christchurch with Wellington, which did not draft or amend a bylaw after
decriminalization, I found that the outcome in Christchurch reflected the interaction of
three major factors: the relative prevalence of street-based sex work, the obligations to
consult constituents placed on the city council by the Local Government Act of 2002, and
The Pressures created by upcoming local elections and council restructuring.
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Extensions
Throughout this dissertation, but especially in Chapter 3, I’ve argued that there is
value in studying cases outside the United States. Law and Society was and remains a
predominantly American subfield; much of our scholarly understanding of the relationship
between law and culture is drawn from empirical studies of the United States. Yet the US
is unique in many ways, from its federal structure to the outsize role of judicial appeals in
processes of legal mobilization. A focus on non-American cases can deepen our
understanding of law and social change by highlighting the ways empirical realities in these
cases are out of step with scholarly expectations implicitly based on American experiences.
However, the social implications of close votes in New Zealand can also yield insights into
contemporary American cases, especially the 2020 US Presidential election. In particular,
this election and its aftermath illustrate the ways in which closeness is constructed, and
how, in the liminal space following a vote perceived as close, political actors deploy
democracy frames to challenge the legitimacy of the outcome.
Was the 2020 Presidential election close? When I first floated this idea to the
members of my writing group, the political scientists in the room replied with an immediate
and resounding ‘No’. Look at the numbers, they said. Not only did Joe Biden decisively
win the Electoral College, he also took the popular vote by over 7 million votes
(Ballotpedia 2020b). This is true, but it also misses the point somewhat. Closeness is
always constructed, and political and media stakeholders frequently invoked the language
of closeness to describe the 2020 Presidential race, especially in the tense days following
November 3rd. On November 5th, the headline of the New York Times International Edition
read, “An American Cliffhanger”; the front page was dedicated to election coverage that
112

highlighted themes of contention and uncertainty. This coverage included an editorial by
Ross Douthat with the headline “Will 2020 Be Decisive?”. The day before, on November
4th, the column ran in the Late Edition of the Times under the headline, “2020 Will Not Be
Decisive” (Douthat 2020a, 2020b). On November 7th, the day the election was called for
Biden, an article in the New York Times puzzled over the perceived uncertainty of the
election with a pull quote reading, “A Cliffhanger of an Election, With One Candidate
Leading by Millions” (Astor 2020). The article quoted a Stanford professor who attributed
the seemingly close result to the Electoral College: “When you split the 150 million votes
into 50 buckets, there’s going to be close results in a certain number of the states. […] This
spawns disputes, and then it spawns lawyers running into court over hairsplitting issues,
trying to win the White House for their candidate even though their candidate hasn’t won
the support of people across the country” (Astor 2020:2–3). The professor aptly illustrates
the ways in which closeness is constructed: political actors capitalize on the ways in which
the electoral system creates narrow victories at the subnational level. In 2020, political
opportunism surrounding close state- and county-level votes was also exacerbated by
Republican effort to cast doubt about the validity and fairness of legitimate electoral
processes like mail-in ballots in the months leading up to Election Day.
In his November 4th column, Ross Douthat speaks directly to the ways in which
close votes engender uncertainty and doubt, which then enable political action:
An election is supposed to be a reality check. It promises the finality of decision, in which
the back-and-forth of political argument gives was to the undeniability of a particular
outcome on a particular day. […] But that finality is still socially and politically
constructed. And democracies can fail – a scenario on many people’s minds these days –
when that constructedness dissolves, when it becomes possible to deny the finality of
election results outright, to continue the contest outside the system or to substitute a
different form of decision for the verdict of the ballot box. (Douthat 2020a:1)
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Douthat refers to a “liminal place, where a combination of factors has made our election
results much less decisive than in the country’s past” (Douthat 2020a:1). He sees close
elections largely as an outcome of this liminal place; I emphasize the ways in which
closeness itself creates and reinforces liminality. Furthermore, when political actors
capitalize on the indeterminacy of close elections in order to invalidate or overturn results,
they often do so by invoking democracy frames.
Opponents of the Prostitution Reform Act and Supreme Court Act framed their
actions in terms of democratic legitimacy, highlighting themes of participation and
ideology. Republican lawmakers attempting to invalidate the 2020 election, for their part,
stress the importance of procedural regularity and responsiveness to constituents. For
example, in early November, the Trump campaign filed suit claiming that thousands of
voters in Maricopa County, Arizona, “were disenfranchised because poll workers directed
them to override a ballot rejection by pressing a green button on the voting machine that
actually disqualified their votes” (Van Voris, Niquette, and Hurtado 2020). By framing
their objections in terms of disenfranchisement, the campaign is invoking a democracy
frame to cast doubt on the legitimacy of the electoral outcome. In April 2021, when the
Republican-controlled Arizona State Senate ordered an audit of more than two million
ballots cast in Maricopa County, they strongly invoked democratic norms. Senate President
Karen Fann portrayed the audit as a necessary response to constituent concerns: “When
almost half of the voters say they lack confidence and have questions about the integrity of
our system, it’s time for someone to step up and give them answers” (Corse 2021). While
Democrats claim that the results of the audit will be used to justify repressive voting laws,
Republicans counter that the final report will be used to protect the “sanctity” of future
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elections. As reported by NPR, “according to documents outlining the contract [with the
data analysis firm hired to oversee the audit], the final report will also include
recommendations to prevent ‘detected weaknesses from being a problem in future
elections’”. Senate President Fann claimed that “information provided by the contractors
will provide the senate with ‘the tools to be able to either tweak existing legislation, or
create new legislation to make sure that the sanctity [of elections] is always there’” (Giles
2021).
To be clear, in New Zealand, efforts to repeal the Prostitution Reform Act and
amend the Supreme Court Act were legitimate and constitutionally-sanctioned responses
to controversial legislation; when the attempts proved unsuccessful, stakeholders accepted
the results and moved on. The same cannot be said of Republican efforts to invalidate the
results of the 2020 US Presidential election. At time of writing, the Arizona audit is
ongoing, and Senate President Karen Fann is reportedly “considering options that could
expand the scope of review further” (Giles 2021). Given the efforts of the Trump
administration to cast doubt on the validity and legitimacy of the results even before
Election Day, Republicans would undoubtedly have pursued legal challenges no matter the
margin. However, portrayals of the vote as close in the days after November 3rd, including
frequent media reports of a “cliffhanger”, likely contributed to a sense of uncertainty or
precarity surrounding the results. Close votes create a liminal space which generates
opportunities for political action. In the wake of the 2020 Presidential election, this has
meant, among other things, the mobilization of democracy frames to invalidate democratic
results.
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Contributions
In this dissertation, I make both methodological and theoretical contributions.
Methodologically, the dissertation is innovative in its use of counterfactuals. In Chapter 2,
I applied the logic of quasi-experimental design to a qualitative study. My exploration of
changes in media representation was inspired by the regression discontinuity design, which
compares outcomes on either side of an arbitrary cut-off. My short-term comparison of sex
work representations immediately before and after a legal change took seriously the
possibility of cultural change after law reform. In this chapter, the six-month snapshot of
newspaper coverage immediately before the passage of the Prostitution Reform Act served
as a counterfactual to coverage from the six-month period following decriminalization.
Rather than assuming cultural lag, I investigated cultural change (operationalized as
changes in media portrayals) empirically. Although my results were modest, I found real
differences in newspaper coverage of sex work immediately after the passage of the Act.
This suggests that short-term comparative studies – and especially those that use a
counterfactual design – are valuable complements to existing research on law and social
change, both related to sex work and more broadly.
The shadow case design I used in Chapter 4 also relies on counterfactual logic. This
chapter compared the development of brothel bylaws in Christchurch, which drafted a
harsh and illegal ordinance after decriminalization, and Wellington, which drafted a
moderate bylaw two years before the passage of the Prostitution Reform Act. These bylaws
were developed in very different legislative environments, and not only in terms of laws
pertaining directly to sex work. By focusing on Wellington’s 2001 bylaw, rather than the
city’s lack of response to the PRA, I showed how the provisions of the Local Elections Act
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(2001) and Local Government Act (2002) played a significant role in shaping the outcome
in Christchurch in 2004. These laws, which were ratified after Wellington had passed its
bylaw, interacted with local conditions and politics to constrain the possible actions of
Christchurch councillors in 2004, resulting in an illegal bylaw.
One of the major theoretical contributions of this dissertation is its application of
the sociology of events to the legal arena. The passage of the Prostitution Reform Act was
a hinge event in the longer sequence of occurrences that constituted the legality of sex work
in New Zealand. The narrow and unexpected passage of the Act itself heralded a new social
and political reality, and its effects were not limited to those working in the sex industry.
Chapter 2 directly incorporated this eventful perspective in the research design, and, while
I can’t speak to the motivations of journalists or editors in covering sex work after
decriminalization, there was a noticeable change in the media landscape after the passage
of the PRA. In Chapter 3, I showed how the sex work law, and especially the circumstances
of its narrow passage, prompted a backlash against decriminalization. In addition, the close
vote on the Prostitution Reform Act shaped the perception of the legitimacy of votes on
the Supreme Court Act and the Civil Unions Act by virtue of their temporal proximity.
Finally, as I illustrated in Chapter 4, while cities had been quietly regulating the location
of massage parlours for years, the full decriminalization of prostitution made many
residents nervous. In Christchurch especially, city councillors felt political pressure to
respond to their constituents by passing a bylaw they knew would not stand up to a legal
challenge. While the dissertation focused primarily on one legal event, the passage of the
Prostitution Reform Act, Chapter 4 suggests that other laws might also be considered legal
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events. Specifically, the Local Elections Act and Local Government Act were important
occurrences in the broader process of local government reform in New Zealand.
This dissertation also tells a story about the complex and often unanticipated
interactions between law and politics, at multiple levels and occasionally across branches
of government. The demands of local governments played an important role in the passage
of the Prostitution Reform Act. Representatives of city councils lobbied the national
government throughout the select committee phase, and, in amending the draft law to
empower cities to regulate the location of brothels, Parliament used municipal interests
strategically in order to secure national political support for decriminalization. The
implementation of the Prostitution Reform Act required cities to navigate the bounds of
their authority not only in the context of the sex work law itself, but also within the scope
of other national laws pertaining to local government. Ultimately, in pursuing a regulatory
process in keeping with the provisions of the Local Government Act, the outcome in
Christchurch was at odds with the stipulations of the Prostitution Reform Act. While sex
work decriminalization in New Zealand was largely achieved in the legislative branch, the
courts intervened to strike down harsh local bylaws, protecting the integrity of the national
law. Unlike in the United States, where the national government often sues subnational
governments in order to enforce a federal policy agenda (see, for example, United States
v. Texas 1892, 1971, 1981, 2016…), New Zealand’s legal battles over brothel bylaws were
initiated by private citizens.
Furthermore, reactions to the Prostitution Reform Act and especially the Supreme
Court Act were shaped by New Zealand’s history as a former British Dominion and settler
colonial state. In New Zealand, as in other countries, indigenous people are
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disproportionately represented in the sex industry, and especially in street-based work
(Abel et al. 2007; Amnesty International 2004). Sex work stigma reflects not only sexist
assumptions, but racist ones as well; these tropes undoubtedly contributed to residents’
hostility toward sex work, especially in Christchurch, where street work was both more
prevalent and more visible. In the case of the Supreme Court Act, both supporters and
opponents to legislation invoked New Zealand’s colonial past to justify passing or rejecting
the legislation. Supporters of the proposed Supreme Court claimed that local knowledge of
indigenous rights under the Treaty of Waitangi was indispensable to the administration of
justice in New Zealand, and questioned whether the British Privy Council was able to fairly
adjudicate cases pertaining to Maori interests (ACT New Zealand 2003c). On the other
hand, some opponents questioned whether there were enough “qualified” New Zealanders
to sit on the Court, and preferred to rely on the expertise and prestige of the Crown
(Campaign for the Privy Council 2003a). This argument was particularly surprising given
there were only six seats on the proposed Supreme Court. Finally, monarchists in New
Zealand worried that the creation of a national Supreme Court was a slippery slope that
would lead to the dissolution of ties with the Crown and the eventual creation of a republic
(Monarchist League of New Zealand 2003). These debates illustrate the legacy of colonial
power relations; New Zealand’s colonial past and contested continued relationship with
Britain interacted with national legislative processes in complex and unexpected ways.
Finally, this dissertation develops our conceptual understanding of how and why
closeness matters in legislative or electoral contests. Political scientists have written
extensively about close elections, but tend to use these contentious votes as analytical tools
to study other things, like incumbency effects, or the role of political connections, or party
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advantage. This scholarship tends to apply quantitative methods to large datasets; close
votes are defined according to an arbitrary numeric cut-off. However, as I argue throughout
the dissertation, closeness is always constructed. The perception of closeness is more
important to the social and political consequences of a vote than the margin itself, and the
factors that contribute to this perception are highly context-specific. For example, the
Supreme Court Act, which passed in December 2003 with 63 votes for and 53 against, was
deemed close largely due to its temporal proximity to the one-vote passage of the
Prostitution Reform Act a few months earlier. By 2005, the Civil Unions Act, which passed
with an even wider margin than the Supreme Court Act, was being cited by opposition
politicians as part of a pattern of narrow (and, by extension, illegitimate) legislative
victories pushed through by the ruling Labour Party – a pattern that also included the
Prostitution Reform and Supreme Court Acts. I argued that close votes are unique in that
they create a liminal space in which new forms of political action can occur. As a result,
politicians have a vested interest in successfully portraying a vote as close. Despite their
prevalence, close votes seem exceptional, and in states of exception, the rules don’t always
apply.
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